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I Basic Concepts 
 
I.1 What is the course about? 
 
Regionalism gives an essential phenomena of 20th-21st century international relations; 
globalizing system of regional integrations, relations between regions and institutions, inter-
regional links connecting different regions all have more and more intense impact on the various 
actors of international relations, such as states, inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and also individuals. 
The course attempts to give an insight into the historical development, successes and dilemmas 
of regional structures targeting regional cooperation and development, emphasizing the extreme 
diversity of forms of regional integrations and analysing the most important tendencies of the 
contemporary world. States of the global South are more and more active participants of 
regionalism and their role has dual importance: their involvement in regional structures has an 
impact on their status in international relations, while forms of regional cooperation they build 
have special features distinguishing these from regional cooperation among Western 
/developed states. The aim of the course is to give an overall picture of today’s system of 
regional and inter-regional cooperation and its forums, and to describe regions in a more 
complex interpretation focusing on political, economic and cultural links among the members, 
analysing the role of regionalism in conflict resolution, development and identity formation. 
After the theoretical introduction (concepts, definitions, history and theories of regionalism), 
we focus on different dimensions of regionalism, such as security, development and identity 
and how these elements are connected to different forms of regional cooperation. Regions are 
presented as case studies, introducing those mechanisms and actors that form the opportunities 
and the concrete forms of regionalism. Finally, inter-regionalism – as the latest development of 
regionalism – will be analysed as a new level of global governance. 
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I.2 What constitutes a region? 
 
The term ’region’ is derived from the Latin word ‘regio’, which is derived from ‘regere’ 
meaning to direct or to rule, so originally regions were interpreted as administrative units within 
a wider entity – such as an empire or a kingdom. From the very beginning, geographical 
closeness was an essential element in defining a region and it is an important character till today, 
but in the 21st century geographical connection is loosing its importance – for example in the 
case of so-called ’currency regions’ countries from different continents might constitute a 
‘region’, of which ‘dollar zone’ is the most well-known case. The ‘Hispanic world’ – Spanish 
speaking territories in Europe and the Americas is also interpreted as a region, though 
geographically it is not a connected area. It is important to emphasize that it is basically 
impossible to give one single definition of the concept ’region’ as different disciplines (history, 
geography, political science, law, sociology, economics, international relations, etc.) examine 
different aspects of regions and regionalism focusing on different elements and dimensions of 
the phenomena. 
Let’s have a look how dictionaries and encyclopaedias define a region. Cambridge Dictionary 
says: ‘region is a particular area or part of the world or any of the large official areas into which 
a country is divided’, then gives the following examples: one of China’s autonomous regions, 
the Nordic/Asia-Pacific region, the Basque region. Oxford Dictionaries give the following 
definition: ‘region is an area, especially part of a country or the world having definable 
characteristics but not always fixed boundaries’. Examples are ‘the equatorial regions’ or ‘a 
major wine-producing region’. 
It is obvious that regions have different categories: below the state level (a region on the 
territory of a state, such as Baranya county in Hungary), above the state level (a region 
consisting of a group of countries, such as East Asia or Western Europe) and transnational level 
(regions that reach the territory of different states, but do not follow state boundaries, such as 
the Andean region). These examples describe very well how categories of various disciplines 
(states, continents, counties, world regions, ethnic regions, etc.) meet and interact in the term 
’region’. Most definitions emphasize four elements at various intensity, which are the 
following: (1) geography, (2) regularity and intensity of interactions, (3) shared regional 
perceptions, and (4) agency (Tavares, 2004. p. 4). Not all the definitions include all the four 
elements mentioned above, but these aspects appear in most of the definitions.  
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Tavares summarizes definitions of a region following these four lines: 
‘… despite the debate on the de-territorialization of geography … very few authors would 
disagree that a region ought to be typified by some level of geographical proximity. The degree 
of importance that is given to territory, however, shows a considerable discrepancy. For 
intellectuals as Palmer … , geography is the pillar in the definition of region; the world is 
thereby an arrangement of neatly demarcated territorial macro-regions. In marked opposition 
constructivists and post-moderns underline that regions are not ‘natural’, ‘given’ or ‘essential’. 
… other scholars focus primarily on the second component, i.e. the constitutive content and the 
degree of internal cohesion of a region. In this endeavour, the literature normally converges 
attention to the formation of regional social linkages (language, culture, ethnicity, awareness of 
a common historical heritage), political linkages (political institutions, ideology, regime types) 
or economic linkages (preferential trade arrangements). … to social constructivists focus should 
not be put as much upon geography nor on material interdependence but mainly on the cognitive 
idea of region brought upon by socialization processes conducted by region-builders. … The 
last item is a most debated one. Classic approaches on regional studies emphasize the role of 
the state in the carving out of regional subsystems. Drawing on Karl Deutsch, Peter Katzenstein 
defines a region as “a set of countries markedly interdependent over a wide range of different 
dimensions. This is often, but not always, indicated by a flow of socio -economic transactions 
and communications and high political salience that differentiates a group of countries from 
others” (1996:130. Italics added). Defining region in this way is more of a limitation than an 
opportunity to post-moderns and social constructivists. They deal with the structure/agency and 
state/nonstate divides by manifestly adopting a micro-oriented perspective that stresses the role 
of bottom up agents.’ 
 
Depending on disciplines, authors have different views and perspectives about what type of 
links and connections give the base of the region. What gives coherence of regions, what 
connects them? Here you find some examples. 
In geography, regions are areas broadly divided by physical characteristics, human impact 
features, and the interaction of humanity and the environment.  
In the field of political geography regions tend to follow political units such as sovereign 
states; subnational units such as provinces, counties, townships, territories, etc.; and 
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multinational groupings, including institutionalized actors such as the European Union (EU), 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the Organisation of American States 
(OAS), as well as ‘informally’ defined regions such as the developing world or the Middle East 
– though the concrete boundaries of last two are not obvious.  
Natural resources can also serve as basis of regions. Natural resource regions can be a topic 
of physical geography or environmental geography, but also have a strong element of human 
geography and economic geography. A coal region, for example, is a physical or 
geomorphological region, but its development and exploitation can make it into an economic 
or a cultural region. (Rumelia Field, the oil field that lies along the border or Iraq and Kuwait 
has a strong historical role and it also played a role in the Gulf War; the Coal Region of 
Pennsylvania).  
Sometimes a region is associated with a religion or an ethnic group. For example, 
Christendom, a term with medieval and renaissance connotations of Christianity is interpreted 
as a sort of social and political polity. The term Muslim world is sometimes used to refer to the 
region of the world where Islam is dominant. Hispanic world means those territories where 
Spanish is spoken as a first language, while the term Arab world refers to those areas where 
Arabic people give majority of the population. 
On a social-constructivist base, Charles Kupchan defines region as a ’group of countries 
sharing a common identity, this collective identity might have several sources’ – depending on 
the region. This perspective supposes that the identity of people living in a group of countries 
(not necessarily neighbouring countries) serves as a starting point and a strong element in 
building a region, it has a priority above geographical situation. 
For international relations (IR) studies end experts, a region is interpreted at the above the state 
level, constituting macro regions or international regions. Joseph Nye gives a well-known and 
widely used definition: a region is ‘a limited number of states linked by a geographical 
relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence’ (international region). Mutual 
interdependence is the innovation of this definition, it gives a new perspective and examines 
regions in the context of globalization in the sense that the process of globalization multiplies 
mutual interdependencies between actors of the international system. It basically describes a 
region in terms of levels of analysis, as a level between the state and the international system. 
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I.3 What is regionalism? 
 
Similarly, to the definition of a region, the phenomena of regionalism is also approached in 
many different ways putting emphasis on different elements and dimensions. Cambridge 
Dictionary gives the following definition: ‘a feeling of loyalty to a particular part of a country 
and a wish for it to be more politically independent’, while the Oxford Dictionaries describes 
regionalism as ‘The theory or practice of regional rather than central systems of administration 
or economic, cultural, or political affiliation.’ Both definitions focus on below the state level 
and introduce regionalism as kind of a stronger and more intense connection to the region 
instead of a wider (national) framework.  
Based on his own concept of a region (international region), Joseph Nye defines regionalism as 
‘Concentrated along some dimension(s), unproportionally, extremely dense network of 
contacts, cooperation, interactivity, interdependence between countries geographically close or 
far from one another’. It concentrates on inter-state links, and he does not specify the nature of 
interactions, giving rather a wide interpretation of regionalism focusing on stronger than usual 
interactivity and interdependence between a group of countries – not necessarily neighbouring 
ones.  
Cohesion between states involved might be given by political (ideology, political system), 
economic (trade partners, economic complementarity), social (common ethnic background, 
religion, language, culture, historical heritage) or institutional (existence of formal regional 
institutions) background. Regionalism always sets common objectives and attempts to find 
different measures to reach or support these objectives. Soft regionalism means that a collective 
regional conscience is built through regional groups and networks, while hard regionalism is 
developed through interstate agreements and institutions, which gives a regular structure and 
performs as an actor in international relations. Relations between soft and hard regionalism is 
rather complex, difficult to describe, but in most cases they reinforce each other – soft 
regionalism might end up in institutions, while regional organisations might strengthen regional 
cooperation in new fields as a result of a spill-over effect with the participation of non-state 
actors. 
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What is the difference between regionalism and regionalisation? The two terms are often used 
interchangeably, although academic literature makes a clear distinction. Here is a summary 
again by Rodrigo Tavares on the difference and connection between the two phenomena. 
‘The dislodgment of regional studies is not only evident in the definition of region but on the 
associated ideas of ‘regionalism’ and ‘regionalization’. For some authors, as Bjorn Hettne and 
Peter Katzenstein, the conceptual differentiation of these terms is very clear. The first means 
the set of ideas and principles that highlight the enmeshing of units in a regional context, 
whereas the second is most often defined as the process of regional interaction (Hettne, 1999-
2001; Katzenstein, forthcoming 2004). Embarking upon the same perception, Andrew Hurrell 
takes regionalization to mean ‘the growth of societal integration within a region and to the often 
undirected processes of social and economic interaction” (1995:39. Italics added). Slightly 
different is Raimo Väyrynen’s stance (2003:43). Although he moves along the same lines 
looking upon regionalization as the dynamic process associated with region formation, 
regionalism is understood as being based on institutionalized intergovernmental coalitions that 
control access to a region. This reading is, however, by any means universally accepted. 
Fishlow and Haggard (1992) sharply distinguish between regionalization, which refers to the 
regional concentration of economic flows, and regionalism, which they define as a political 
process characterized by economic policy cooperation and coordination among countries. On 
the contrary, Bhagwati defines regionalism as a preferential trade agreement among a subset of 
nations (1999). Gamble and Payne, walking on a different route, define regionalism as a state-
led project, whereas regionalization is primarily taken as a societal construction (1996). As no 
particular classification is taken as prevalent and as all of them presuppose a degree of 
correctness, my suggestion is, by moving away from content/agency distinctions, assessing the 
etymologic nature of the words. The word ‘regionalism’ contains the Greek Sufism ‘ism’, 
which means ‘the act, state, or theory of’. Regionalism shall, therefore, be approached as the 
theory that investigates the process of regionalization.’ 
 
Regional cooperation is an open-ended process, where states and/or non-state actors act 
together to solve certain tasks – these tasks might range from infrastructural projects through 
energy plans to better education. Actors might have conflicting interests in several other 
questions, but they cooperate for the sake of the region in a given area. Regional cooperation 
might be temporary or permanent, and it also might lead to deeper and more regular interactions 
in the future. 
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Regional integration is a more permanent and deeper phenomena, as in this case previously 
autonomous entities form a totally new whole, a new unity that is able to act on its own. We 
make distinction between political integration (meaning a transnational political system after 
all), economic integration (emergence of transnational economic links) and social integration 
(leading to a transnational society). Reinforced cooperation results in complex transformation 
where units from isolation move towards partial or total integration giving a new entity that is 
more than its original components and will be able to act on its own. 
 
I.4 Evolution of regionalism 
 
Regionalism has shown different forms and types during history – from regional alliances to 
deeply institutionalized regional organisations, such as the European Union. The following 
table gives a summary of the most often types of regionalism, that till today exist parallelly 
showing the different types of this rather diverse phenomena. 
 
Type Actors Level Regional 
Program 
External Goals Most 
important 
issues 
Old Social 
movements 
(conservative, 
ethno-
nationalist) 
 
Subnational, 
sub-state 
Symbolic 
reproduction, 
exclusion of 
multicultural 
identities 
 
Nationastate 
through 
separatism 
 
Ethnic policy, 
minorities 
 
New Social and 
cultural 
movements 
Subnational, 
sub-state 
Formal 
reproduction, 
exclusion of 
centralized 
developemnt 
 
Decentralization, 
federalism 
 
Modernisation, 
colonisation 
Postmodern Social and 
individual 
(companies, 
technology and 
innovation) 
 
Subnational 
economic areas 
 
Material 
reproduction 
 
SMEs, make 
regional (local) 
economy more 
competitive 
 
Globalization, 
global 
economy, 
competition  
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Transnational Collective, 
social and 
individual 
(regional 
authorities, 
private 
organisations) 
 
Subnational, 
transnational 
and 
supranational 
 
Formal, 
material and 
symbolic 
reproduction 
excluding 
strategies of old 
and new 
regionalism 
 
European 
integration as a 
field of 
transnational 
learning 
 
Supranational 
institutions, 
european 
integration, 
inter-regional 
networking 
 
International Collective 
(nation states 
and IOs) 
 
International 
region 
Formal and/or 
material 
reproduction 
with political 
and economic 
strategies 
 
Security, 
economic 
development 
 
World politics, 
global 
governance, 
globalisation, 
regional 
economic 
development 
 
Source: Peter Schmitt-Egner: The Concept of 'Region': Theoretical and Methodological Notes on its 
Reconstruction. Journal of European Integration. Vol. 24. 2002, Issue 3. p. 189. 
 
Based on the above table and article of Schmitt-Egner, the different types of regionalism could 
be described as follows: 
 
Old regionalism. This type of regionalism basically means ethno-nationalist movements, a 
central element is identity policy strongly attached to the region and an important aim is 
separatism, to build a new entity outside the current state-framework. Ex-Yugoslavia is a typical 
example here, Scottish and Catalan ambitions are also often mentioned in this case. 
New regionalism. It is similar to the previous one, but this new form leaves behind the desire 
to redraw state borders, it rather targets regional modernization and autonomy to more 
independent from the central government. Decentralization and federalism are keywords for 
these social-cultural movements, from the 1970s we can see various examples, such as Bretagne 
in France or indigenous movements in Bolivia.  
(It is important to emphasize that these forms of ‘old’ and ‘new’ regionalism are different from 
the first and second wave of regionalism discussed later, that are also mentioned as old and new 
regionalism.) 
Postmodern regionalism. This type is totally different from the previous two, as it does not 
insist on formal reality or cultural homogeneity,  it is rather described as local answers given to 
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global challenges. It uses new, modern technologies to build and strengthen the region, focuses 
on smaller areas, such as industrial zones that achieve competitiveness through innovation, 
flexibility and quick reactions. 
Transnational regionalism. In this case, transnational processes and interactions are in focus, 
the emergence of transnational networks give the base of this type of regionalism. The European 
Union is the most obvious and visible example here, as borders are permeable and transnational 
flow of information and knowledge is an essential tendency. These transnational flows reinforce 
integration and make the parts more connected. 
International regionalism. This type refers to inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) and 
networks focusing on a given territory. It focuses on the above the region level, so basically this 
type of regionalism is that matters most in international relations. These actors attempt to 
guarantee their own security and well-being in the framework of globalisation and global 
governance – the phenomena of global governance will be discussed later.   
 
When theory of regionalism is described, the evolution of regionalism and the level of 
‘regionness’ must be detailed as it serves as basis for many research in this field and determines 
the academic perspective on international regionalism. 
The concept ‘regionness’ was introduced by Björn Hettne and it is used regularly in academic 
literature discussing regionalism, regionalisation and various forms of regional cooperation. It 
basically attempts to describe the depth of regionalisation, distinguishing different phases of 
the process measured by the level of ‘regionness’. 
Hettne outlined a five-level model, which follows the logic of modernization theories, and gives 
an evolutionary approach, though instead of supposing that all the regions go through similar 
phases of a linear development he emphasizes that the level of regionness might increase or 
decrease. He writes: ‘There are no ‘natural’ or ‘given’ regions, but these are created and 
recreated in the process of global transformation. Regionness can be understood in analogy with 
concepts such as ‘stateness’ and ‘nationness’. The regionalisation process can be intentional or 
non-intentional and may proceed unevenly along the various dimensions of the ‘new 
regionalism’ (i.e. economics, politics, culture, security etc.). In what follows we will describe 
five generalised levels of regionness, which can be said to define a particular region in terms of 
regional coherence and community.’ 
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Here you find the most important characteristics and elements of the five levels Hettne 
distinguishes:  
 
’Regional space. First of all one can therefore identify a potential region as a primarily 
geographical unit, delimited by more or less natural physical barriers and marked by ecological 
characteristics: ‘Europe from the Atlantic to the Ural’, North America, the Southern cone of 
South America, ‘Africa South of Sahara’, Central Asia, or ‘the Indian subcontinent’. In the 
earliest history of such an area, people presumably lived in small isolated communities with 
little contact. This first level can therefore be referred to as a ‘proto-region’, or a ‘pre-regional 
zone’, since there is no organised international/world society in this situation. … In order to 
further regionalise, a particular territory must, necessarily, experience increasing interaction 
and more frequent contact between human communities, which after living as ‘isolated’ 
groupings are moving towards some kind of translocal relationship, giving rise to a regional 
social system or what will be called regional complex below. 
Regional Complex. Increased social contacts and transactions between previously more 
isolated groups —the creation of a social system —facilitates some sort of regionness, albeit 
on a low level. The creation of Latin Christendom between 800 and 1200, which also implied 
the birth of a European identity, is a case in point. The emergence of a regional complex thus 
implies ever widening translocal relations —positive and/or negative —between human groups 
and influences between cultures (‘little traditions’). It is reasonable to assume that regional 
identities may be historically deep-seated. … The territorial states by definition monopolise all 
external relations and decide who are friend or foe, which implies a discouragement of whatever 
regional consciousness there might be. The existing social relations in a nation-state system 
may very well be hostile and completely lacking in cooperation. In fact this is a defining feature 
of a nation-state system according to the dominant theoretical school in IR. The people of the 
separate ‘nation-states’ are not likely to have much knowledge of or mutual trust in each other, 
much less a shared identity. When the states relax their ‘inward-orientedness’ and become more 
open to external relations, the degree of transnational contact may increase dramatically, which 
may trigger a process of further regionalisation in various fields. In security terms the region at 
this level is best understood as a ‘conflict formation’ or a ‘regional (in)security complex’, in 
which the constituent units, as far as their own security is concerned, are dependent on each 
other as well as on the overall stability of the regional system. … At this low level of regionness, 
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a balance of power, or some kind of ‘concert’, is the sole security guarantee for the states 
constituting the system. This is a rather primitive security mechanism. We could therefore talk 
of a ‘primitive’ region, exemplified by the Balkans today, and as far as political security is 
concerned (in spite of a relatively high degree of economic regionalisation) by East Asia. 
Similarly to security matters, the political economy of development can be understood as 
‘anarchic’, implying that there exists no transnational welfare mechanism which can ensure a 
functioning regional economic system. … There is no shared sense of ‘sitting in the same boat’. 
Exchanges and economic interactions are unstable, short-sighted and based on self-interest 
rather than expectations of economic reciprocity, social communication and mutual trust. 
Regional Society. This is the level where the crucial regionalisation process develops and 
intensifies, in the sense that a number of different actors apart from states appear on different 
societal levels and move towards transcendence of national space, making use of a more rule-
based pattern of relations. The dynamics at this stage implies the emergence of a variety of 
processes of communication and interaction between a multitude of state and non-state actors 
and along several dimensions, economic as well as political and cultural, i.e. multidimensional 
regionalisation. This rise in intensity, scope and width of regionalisation may come about 
through formalised regional cooperation or more spontaneously. … In order to further 
regionalise, the great diversity of processes at various levels (i.e. macro-micro) and in various 
sectors must to an increasing extent become mutually reinforcing and evolve in a 
complementary or mutually reinforcing rather than competitive and diverging direction. The 
increasing and widening relationships between the formal and the real region lead to an 
institutionalisation of cognitive structures and a gradual deepening of mutual trust and 
responsiveness. Formal organisations and social institutions play a crucial role in this process 
leading towards community and region-building. 
Regional Community. … refers to the process whereby the region increasingly turns into an 
active subject with a distinct identity, institutionalised or informal actor capability, legitimacy, 
and structure ofdecision-making, in relation with a more or less responsive regional civil 
society, transcending the old state borders. It implies a convergence and compatibility of ideas, 
organisations and processes within a particular region. In security terms, to continue this line 
of argument, the reference is to ‘security community’, and its recent rediscovery, which means 
that the level of regionness achieved makes it inconceivable to solve conflicts by violent means, 
between as well as within former states. With regard to development, the regional sphere is not 
merely reduced to a ‘market’, but there exist also regional mechanisms that can offset the 
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polarisation effects inherent in the market and ensure social security, regional balance and 
welfare, with similar albeit still embryonic functions as in the old states. regional community is 
characterised by a mutually reinforcing relationship between the ‘formal’ region, defined by 
the community of states, and the ‘real’ region, in which a transnationalised regional civil society 
also has a role to play. The regional civil society may emerge spontaneously from ‘below’, but 
is ultimately dependent on that enduring (formal and informal) institutions and ‘regimes’ 
facilitate and promote security, welfare, social communication and convergence of values, 
norms, identities and actions throughout the region. … The defining element is rather the 
multidimensional and voluntary quality of regional interaction, and the societal characteristics 
indicating an emerging regional community. Some examples are the Nordic group of countries 
and perhaps North America (gradually including Mexico). On their way are the Southern Cone 
of South America and (at least the original) members of ASEAN. 
Region-state. In the still rather hypothetical and perhaps unlikely fifth level of regionness, the 
processes shaping the ‘formal’ and ‘real’ region are similar, but by no means identical, to state-
formation and nation-building. The ultimate outcome could be a region-state, which in terms 
ofscope and cultural heterogeneity can be compared to the classical empires. A region-state 
must be distinguished from a nation-state. It will never aspire to that degree of homogeneity 
and sovereignty as the Westphalian type of state, and therefore a regionalised order cannot be 
regarded simply as Westphalianism with fever units. … n terms of political order, a region-state 
constitutes a voluntary evolution of a group of formerly sovereign national communities into a 
new form of political entity, where sovereignty is pooled for the best of all, and which is 
radically more democratic than other ‘international’ polities. National interests may prevail but 
do not necessarily become identical with nation-states. Moreover, authority, power and 
decision-making are not centralised but layered, decentralised to the local, micro-regional, 
national and macro-regional/supranational levels. This is basically the idea of the EU as 
outlined in the Maastricht Treaty. … For other regions than Europe this may be far into the 
future, but should by no means be ruled out. Stranger things have happened in history. Besides, 
we do not suggest repetitions of a European path, simply that the decreasing nation-state 
capacity will give room for a multilevel governance structure, where the regional level for 
historical and pragmatic reasons will play a significant role.’ (Hettne –Söderbaum, 2000 pp. 
457-473.) 
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Hettne’s theory gives concrete historical and current examples of the different levels he 
describes. He characterizes these stages in terms of political, economic and social 
connectedness and also emphasizes the role of non-state actors, the layers of governance in case 
of all the levels. Basically, he uses the European integration process as a role model as the final 
stage (region-state) is described as an entity that functions in a very similar way to states – and 
obviously the European Union is closest to this level of ‘regionness’, although the author 
himself admits that a future where the international system consists of of region-states is highly 
hypothetical.  
About regionalism theory another essential model is given by Andrew Hurrell, introducing 
the following categories regarding the varieties of regionalism: 
- regionalisation (he also uses the term informal/soft regionalism) means strengthening regional 
interactions without direct state involvement, mostly initiated and led by market forces and 
business actors;  
- regional consciousness and identity is often the most essential driving force in regionalism, 
and it might be the consequence of internal (common historical heritage, culture and religion) 
and/or external (security or other threats) factors;   
- regional inter-state cooperation equals negotiations about and establishment of inter-
governmental agreements and regimes, this form might be formal or informal – the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) is a good example here;  
- state supported regional integration is basically a sub-category of the previous one meaning 
specific decisions by governments in a given policy area, for example the elimination of trade 
barriers or the introduction of free movement of people;  
- regional cohesion is basically kind of a result of the coexistence of the previous four meaning 
a united, permanent, consolidated regional unit. ‘Cohesion can be understood in two senses: (a) 
when the region plays a defining role in the relations between the states (and other major actors) 
of that region and the rest of the world; and (b) when the region forms the organizing basis for 
policy within the region across a range of issue’ (Hurrell, 1995, pp. 334-338.) 
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I.5 What drives regionalism? 
 
Regarding drivers of regionalism it is always debated whether regionalism is the result of 
conscious policy making by state leaders (from above regionalism) or it is rather the 
consequence of spontaneous cooperation and networking of business and societal groups and/or 
individuals (from below regionalism). In both cases a very simple and natural desire motivates 
actions: to make the narrower or wider regional environment more peaceful, prosperous, 
pleasant, clean, liveable, viable, etc. – altogether to reach results that are perceived as positive 
changes by state leaders, business groups, inhabitants, etc. of the region.  Here I introduce those 
most essential political and economic factors that motivate and reinforce regionalism. 
 
I.5.1 Political factors  
Identity. Belonging to a region supports involvement and active participation in regional affairs. 
Identity plays an essential part in which states and other actors identify themselves with the 
given region. Internal factors behind common regional identity might be common religion, 
culture and history, while external factors are often common security or economic threat. 
Regional identity in itself does not necessarily lead to regional cooperation, usually a common 
decision is needed to make the region a better place. 
Internal and external threat. Perceived threat might be essential in stronger and more regular 
regional cooperation, it is often an important motivation in case of institution building. During 
the Cold War threat of Soviet expansionism gave impetus to integration in Western Europe and 
also had a direct impact on the establishment of NATO. The case of Germany is interesting in 
the European integration, as for the signing parties of the Treaty of Rome, it was an essential 
motivation to control Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) and prevent a dominant 
Germany in Europe, but instead of excluding Germany from the integration process they rather 
included it and built strong political and economic connections among all the member states. 
The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 with the 
motivation of the founding members to defend themselves from Communist China. The League 
of Arab Nations (1945) aims to protect its members from Israel (though the state of Israel was 
established in 1948) from the beginning till today.  
Domestic politics. Domestic power structures and domestic actors often have an impact on state 
participation in regional integration. Producers, employers, business groups, small and medium 
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enterprises, farmers, trade unions, etc. all have interests regarding regionalism – the support or 
reject involvement in regional cooperation or regional institutions depending on the possible 
benefits and/or challenges of participation. 
Dominance/leadership. Regionalism requires leadership of key actor or actors in the region; 
when the European integration began, the French and the Germans played important roles, in 
the case of ASEAN, Indonesia attempted to have a major role in defining objectives and declare 
goals, Egypt had an essential part in the establishment of the League of Arab Nations, while the 
United States grounded the Organisation of American States (OAS) and NATO in the 1940s. It 
is always a sensitive issue and it is difficult to find balance in these situations: the leader(s) 
should pay the costs, but the leader(s) should not get into a totally dominant position leading to 
an hierarchical structure. After the end of the Cold War, two further factors motivated the birth 
of regional institutions: competition among rival trade blocs led to the situation that no one 
wanted to lag behind in this process, while with the end of East-West rivalry, several regions 
or groups of states got afraid of marginalization and perceived regional cooperation as a way to 
prevent it. 
 
I.5.2 Economic factors 
High level of economic interdependencies, intense trade relations, complementary economies, 
desire to attract more foreign investments, to widen domestic markets are the most essential 
and general motivating forces. Interdependencies result in higher costs, if agreed and 
coordinated national policies lack. Increasing economic interdependencies increase the pressure 
on governments to cooperate in their own interests.  
The emergence of multinational companies (MNCs) as non-state actors – having increasing 
importance in international relations – is an important driving force behind strengthening 
regional economic cooperation. In many cases, regional economic cooperation occurs with the 
strong involvement of MNCs, business firms and local companies.  
Development is another essential driving force, especially in the case of developing countries. 
This issue will be discussed in more details later, but diversification of trade relations and a 
deeper integration into world economy are often considered as important sources of 
development; and joining regional blocs is considered to be a step into this direction. 
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I.6 Regions in the world 
 
Which are the most obvious and most important regions in the international system? It is not 
easy to answer this question as we can find different classifications based on continents, natural 
resources, religions, languages, identity, standard of living, etc. As a starting point, let’s have a 
look at methodology of the UN, how UN statistics divide the world into regions. UN 
Geoshceme follows the next categorization: 
 
Africa 
Northern Africa – Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and Western Sahara. 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
- Eastern Africa – British Indian Ocean Territory, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, French Southern Territories, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mayotte, Mozambique, Réunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, 
United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
- Middle Africa – Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe 
- Southern Africa – Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa 
- Western Africa – Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Saint Helena, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone és Togo 
 
The Americas  
Latin America and the Caribbean 
- Caribbean – Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Bonaire, Sint 
Eustatius and Saba, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Curaçao, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat, 
Puerto Rico, Saint Barthélemy, Saint Kitts and Névis, Saint Lucia, Saint Martin (French 
Part), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sint Maarten (Dutch part), Trinidad and 
Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States Virgin Islands 
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- Central America – Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama 
- South America – Argentina, Bolivia, Bouvet Island, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Falkland Islands, French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, South Georgia and the South 
Sandwich Islands, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela 
Northern America – Bermuda, Canada, Greenland, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, United States of 
America 
 
Asia 
Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 
Eastern Asia – China, China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China, Macao Special 
Administrative Region, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Republic of 
Korea 
South-eastern Asia - Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic 
Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Viet Nam 
Southern Asia – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka 
Western Asia – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrein, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, United 
Arab Emirates, Yemen 
 
Europe 
Eastern Europe – Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Republic of Moldova, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Ukraine 
Northern Europe - Åland Islands, Channel Islands, Denmark, Estonia, Faroe Islands, Finland, 
Iceland, Ireland, Isle of Man, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands, 
Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
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Southern Europe – Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Gibraltar, Greece, 
Holy See, Italy, Malta, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Portugal, San Marino, Serbia, Slovenia, 
Spain 
Western Europe – Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, 
Netherlands, Switzerland 
 
Oceania 
Australia and New Zealand – Australia, Christmas Island, Cocos Island, Heard Island and 
McDonald Islands, New Zealand, Norfolk Island 
Melanesia – Fiji, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu 
Micronesia – Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Island, Micronesia (Federal States of), Nauru, Northern 
Mariana Islands, Palau, United States Minor Outlying Islands 
Polynesia – American Samoa, Cook Island, French Polynesia, Niue, Pitcairn, Samoa, Tokelau, 
Tonga, Tuvalu, Wallis and Futuna Islands 
 
The list of geographic regions above presents the composition of geographical regions used by 
the Statistics Division (UN) in its publications and databases. Each country or area is shown in 
one region only. These geographic regions are based on continental regions; which are further 
subdivided into sub-regions and intermediary regions drawn as to obtain greater homogeneity 
in sizes of population, demographic circumstances and accuracy of demographic statistics. So, 
these regions are strictly geographical ones, they do not follow political, economic or cultural 
background. 
Besides this list, the UN adds further categories, but they follow classification based on level 
of development. Developed and developing regions are ‘old’ expressions, though till today 
there is no established convention for the designation of "developed" and "developing" 
countries or regions in the United Nations system. Categories, like Least Developed Countries 
(LDC), Land Locked Developing Countries (LLDC) and Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS) are relatively new ones and they are responses to the more and more obvious diversity 
of the so-called developing world. 
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The following map demonstrates the five regions of the world used in UN organs and bodies, 
for example regarding membership in certain forums. These regions give the base for the 
election of the non-permanent members of the UN Security Council guaranteeing geographical 
representation. 
This map shows the geographic regions used by the United Nations 
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The World Bank gives another division of the world, taking into consideration political and 
economic factors besides geography 
 
 
 
I.7 Regional international organisations 
 
Regional international organisations are permanent, structured forms of regional cooperation. 
For IR Scholars, regional organisations (and international organisations in general) are 
perceived as actors in the international system. They are not as old as states and they do not 
have as essential influence as states have, but their participation and involvement in 
international affairs is undeniable. International organisations are defined as ‘IGOs are 
organizations that include at least three states as members, that have activities in several states, 
and that are created through a formal inter-governmental agreement such as a treaty, charter, or 
statute. They also have headquarters, executive heads, bureaucracies, and budgets. In 2013–
2014, the Yearbook of International Organizations identified about 265 IGOs ranging in size 
from 3 members (the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]) to more than 190 
members (the Universal Postal Union [UPU]). Members may come primarily from one 
geographic region (as in the case of the Organization of American States [OAS]) or from all 
geographic regions (as in the case of the World Bank).’ (Karns-Mingst-Stiles, 2015, p. 12) 
In terms of geographic scope IGOs are classified as global (e. g. UN, WHO), regional (EU, AU, 
ASEAN) and sub-regional (Mercosur, ECOWAS) IGOs. Regional international organisations 
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can be classified into further categories – after name of the organisation, year of establishment, 
number of member states: 
 
• Multipurpose organisations (Organisation of American States, 1948, 35; League of 
Arab Nations, 1945, 22; Organisation of African Unity, 1963, 52; Nordic Council, 1949, 
8) 
• Security/Defense organisations (NATO, 1949, 28; ANZUS, 1952, 3) 
• Functional organisations (Inter-American Development Bank, 1959, 46; ECOWAS, 
1975, 16; APEC, 1989, 19, Council of Europe, 1949, 47) 
• UN Regional Commissions (Economic Commission for Europe, 1947, 55; Economic 
Commission for Africa, 1958, 53; Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 1948, 41; Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 1947, 
53; Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, 1973, 13) 
 
Most of the examples mentioned above are regional organisations in geographic sense, meaning 
that members identify themselves with the same region/subregion and these institutions work 
for the interests (well-being, defence, stronger position, more intense trade, etc.) of the given 
region. But, in some cases, geographical closeness or belonging to the same region is far from 
obvious. For example, NATO in principle – as its name suggests – connects members of the 
Transatlantic world, but the membership of Turkey, which is obviously not member of the 
Transatlantic community, shows that strategic interests and Cold War reality overwrote 
geographical situation. Or, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
has Europe in its name, but it comprises 57 participating States that span the globe, 
encompassing three continents - North America, Europe and Asia – with membership of the 
United States, Canada and Turkmenistan, which geographically do not belong to Europe. In the 
21st century, we can see more and more examples of transcontinental regional organisations, 
such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) with the membership of the United States, 
Chile, Japan and Australia, just to mention a few of them. 
For IR scholars, regional international organisations are the most studied actors when 
regionalism is discussed, so we also focus on them as units influencing international political 
and economic tendencies. Meanwhile, it has to be emphasized that the role of regional 
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organisations is limited, it is not comparable to the status and influence of states – maybe with 
the exception of the European Union as a quasi supranational entity. On the other hand, as in 
the 21st century states all around the world are usually members of more than one regional 
institution, these new actors have impact on state behaviour, their agenda declares regional 
objectives and targets, their operation might create regional plans and projects, so after all, they 
have a strong role in the future of the regions they represent and they influence the bilateral 
relations between parts of the region. As regional organisations are permanent structures, they 
often require permanent presence on behalf of the states, which means that members of the 
organisation have to articulate their regional interests and are forced to react to ideas and plans 
of other members. 
Regional organisations are the highest level or strongest form of regular regional cooperation, 
as they have a permanent structure and declared objective; they are also agents representing the 
group of member states. With the rise of the phenomena inter-regionalism (see below), they are 
more and more active members of the international community reflecting on the challenges of 
globalization and rivalry among regions. Although regionalism is a much wider phenomena 
than regional organisations, IR scholars focus on regional organisations in research as they are 
essential actors in regional cooperation and their achievements and limitations often describe 
perfectly regional dynamics and relations between states of the given region.  
 
I.8 The United Nations and regional organisations 
 
Links between regional and universal organisations (the UN family) is essential to understand 
the role and opportunities of regional organisations in the international system. Regional 
organisations are older than the UN system, at the birth of the United Nations the Pan-American 
Union and the League of Arab Nations already existed, therefore the future of these regional 
institutions were on the table at the San Francisco conference, where the UN Charter was 
completed. The Charter attempted to find a role for regional organisations in the future, but it 
is rather obvious that at the birth of the UN, the founding fathers was not aware of the later rise 
in number of international organisations and it is also obvious that they wanted to preserve 
priority for the UN, especially in peace and security matters.  
What does the UN Charter say about regional organisations? Chapter VIII outlines the 
opportunities of cooperation between the Un and regional organisations. 
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‘Article 52 
1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or 
agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace 
and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or 
agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the 
United Nations. 
2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting 
such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes 
through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them 
to the Security Council. 
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local 
disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the 
initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council. 
4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35. 
Article 53 
1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or 
agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be 
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of 
the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined 
in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional 
arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, 
until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be 
charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state. 
2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which 
during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present 
Charter. 
Article 54 
The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in 
contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.’ (UN Charter) 
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It means, that the UN Security Council has a priority over ’regional arrangements’, meaning 
that regional agencies should respect all the purposes and principles of the UN, they can initiate 
enforcement actions only with the approval of the Security Council and the UNSC has to be 
fully informed about regional actions aiming the maintenance of international peace and 
security. These ideas reinforce the primary role of the UNSC in preserving international peace 
and security which was an essential idea of the UN structure.  
During the Cold War era, regional arrangements and agencies were not too active in conflict 
settlement – with a few exceptions, such as the Organisation of American States under US 
dominance. But after the end of the Cold War, regional and local armed conflicts spread 
resulting in renewed interest in regional organisations and their more intense involvement in 
solving these regional conflicts. The United Nations system seemed to be unable to solve the 
rising number of conflicts all around the world on its own, so new forms and opportunities of 
cooperation emerged between the UN and regional actors. ’United Nations Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali had an important role when he gave speech in 1992 at the UN General 
Assembly stating, that ’Regional action […] could not only lighten the burden of the (UN 
Security) Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and 
democratization in international affairs,’ focusing on possible positive consequences of 
reinforced links between the UN and regional organisations. Since 1992 a more and more 
intense cooperation and partnership has been experienced. The Security Council issued 
Resolution 1631 on the cooperation between the UN and regional organizations in order to 
maintain international peace and security in 2005, after holding several debates on the topic. 
(Luk Van Langenhove, 2014)  
Innovation of Resolution 1631 is the topic itself, it called attention for the necessity of 
cooperation between universal and regional organisations for better efficiency and it also 
declared that regional organisations contribute more and more actively to maintaining 
international peace and security and that they complement the work of the UN. 
It says that the UNSC  
’1. Expresses its determination to take appropriate steps to the further development of 
cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in 
maintaining international peace and security, consistent with Chapter VIII of the United Nations 
Charter, and invites regional and subregional organizations that have a capacity for conflict 
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prevention or peacekeeping to place such capacities in the framework of the United Nations 
Stand by Arrangements System; 
2. Urges all States and relevant international organizations to contribute to strengthening the 
capacity of regional and subregional organizations, in particular of African regional and 
subregional organizations, in conflict prevention and crisis management, and in post-conflict 
stabilization, including through the provision of human, technical and financial assistance, and 
welcomes in this regard the establishment by the European Union of the Peace Facility for 
Africa; 
3. Stresses the importance for the United Nations of developing regional and subregional 
organizations’ ability to deploy peacekeeping forces rapidly in support of United Nations 
peacekeeping operations or other Security Council-mandated operations, and welcomes 
relevant initiatives taken in this regard; 
4. Stresses the potential role of regional and subregional organizations in addressing the illicit 
trade in small arms and light weapons and the need to take into account in the peacekeeping 
operations’ mandates, where appropriate, the regional instruments enabling states to identify 
and trace illegal small arms and light weapons; 
5. Reiterates the need to encourage regional cooperation, including through the 
involvement of regional and subregional organizations in the peaceful settlement of disputes, 
and to include, where appropriate, specific provisions to this aim in future mandates of 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations authorized by the Security Council; 
6. We l c o m e s the efforts undertaken by its subsidiary bodies with responsibilities in counter-
terrorism to foster cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, notes with 
appreciation the efforts made by an increasing number of regional and subregional 
organizations in the fight against terrorism and urges all relevant regional and subregional 
organizations to enhance the effectiveness of their counter-terrorism efforts within their 
respective mandates, including with a view to develop their capacity to help Member States in 
their efforts to tackle the threats to international peace and security posed by acts of terrorism; 
7. Expresses its intention to hold regular meetings as appropriate with heads of regional and 
subregional organizations in order to strengthen the interaction and cooperation with these 
organizations in maintaining international peace and security, ensuring if possible that such 
meetings coincide with the annual high-level meetings held by the United Nations with regional 
and other intergovernmental organizations for better efficiency of participation and substantive 
complementarity of agendas; 
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8. Recommends better communication between the United Nations and regional and 
subregional organizations through, notably, liaison officers and holding of consultations at all 
appropriate levels;’ (UNSC Resolution 1631) 
 
Cooperation between regional organisations and the UN is expected to be deeper and more 
intense in the future. The most important issue about the role of the universal and regional level 
of governance is whether they complement or they compete with each other. Often, they 
establish parallel structures in conflict prevention, trade relations or human rights protection 
resulting in a less efficient system. Historically, mutual distrust between universal and regional 
organisations prevents effective and more regular cooperation, but positive examples, such as 
Kosovo, the Darfur crisis or humanitarian catastrophes could be mentioned, too, which could 
serve as models for future cooperation. These forms of joint action have the advantage that they 
give the weight of the international community, but they also guarantee that roots and causes 
of local challenges are well known and regional players are involved in the solution, which 
might have long-term benefits. 
 
Debate between universalists and regionalists are strongly connected to the role and 
effectiveness of international organisations. After WWII, with the establishment of the United 
Nations (UN) system, universalism seemed to be the most convenient approach towards the 
settlement of international conflicts, prevention of a WWIII and a more harmonious 
international system. Parallelly, also from the 1940s, regional frameworks emerged all around 
the world as regional responses to political, economic and social challenges. Universal and 
regional institutions show different attitudes towards international cooperation with different 
number of participants and in many cases with different objectives. 
The debate is about whether regional or universal organisations are the most efficient, 
appropriate and successful forums to give answers to political and economic challenges. Which 
serves better the interests of the international community and which guarantees peace? Of 
course, universalists and regionalists both have their own arguments, which are the following. 
Universalists emphasize that symmetrical and asymmetrical dependencies, just like global 
challenges can be tackled at the global level – these issues cross borders and also regions, they 
have impacts on the international system as a whole, therefore only global solutions could be 
appropriate. Besides, regional resources are often not sufficient to tackle political conflicts or 
humanitarian issues, this is especially the case with developing regions. African, Asian and 
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Latin American regional frameworks often lack capital and resources to build a more efficient 
system. Another argument on behalf of the universalists is that regional organisations are often 
dominated by one or two strong regional actors, but universal frameworks, such as the UN, are 
able to counterbalance the role of dominant powers and are able to contain their influence. In a 
similar way, universal institutions are capable to act against aggressor countries as these 
organisations represent the international community, therefore they influence strong countries’ 
behaviour. Regions are not permanent – universalists emphasize and they argue that global 
order can not be based on such unstable and indefinite contours. Regional dynamics and 
regional actors’ interests might change in time, while for long term solutions permanent 
structures are needed. Regional alliances are often rivals, which undermines the creation of a 
global peaceful system. Military rivalry among regions might result in wars and regionalism in 
itself might lead to stronger and more visible differences between regions that do not support 
harmony in international relations. 
On the other side, which are the arguments of regionalists? First of all, they perceive it as a 
natural tendency that neighbouring countries attempt to build good relations for a more safe, 
more developed and harmonious region. Actors have common (or similar) historical and 
cultural background resulting in common values and traditions and these might serve as 
important bases for regional coherence.   
Another essential argument goes that lower number of actors guarantee easier decision-making 
process and easier political, economic and social integration. Global procedures are extremely 
slow and often it is impossible to find common ground because of conflicting interests, so global 
integration is rather impossible.  
A third argument emphasizes that regional economic cooperation establishes effective 
economic units, which are more well-equipped and as a result might be more successful in 
global competition. Based on this, a possible future scenario could be kind of a global 
equilibrium formed by strong and integrated regional actors supporting international peace and 
security, as possible aggressors are controlled by regional integration systems. G8 could be 
replaced by regional organisations representing all the regions of the world. At the moment – 
regionalists emphasize – the world is not prepared for a global authority or global government, 
but reinforced regional structures could serve as models and could collect experiences in this 
field, and finally end up in a more effective way of global governance. (Blahó – Prandler, 2001, 
pp. 251-252) 
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So, regionalism could also be defined as kind of a ‘bridge’ between bilateral and global 
cooperation. Different forms of regional cooperation – in fields of politics, economics, security, 
culture, etc. – are reinforced by multipolarity in the world. 
 
I.9 Waves of regionalism 
 
History of regionalism is divided into three waves or three phases of regionalism by experts, 
showing different periods of time and different characteristics. This categorization of 
regionalism reflects the motivation of academia to describe the phenomena of regionalism in a 
more structured and ‘organized’ way to have a deeper understanding.  
First wave of regionalism emerged in the 1950s – although there already had existed regional 
institutions at that time. After WWII, two different lines of regionalism started do develop 
parallelly in time – Cold War institutionalisation focusing on security issues that made the blocs 
more structured and well-defined and attempts at integrations following the European 
integrations. In the second case, motivation was to build strong trade blocs with the objective 
to create a common market later on for economic benefits. Outside the EU and mainly in Latin 
America theoretical background was the ‘trade-creation vs. trade-diversion’ theory with the aim 
to divert or reorient trade with third partners towards regional partners. (Based on András 
Inotai’s remarks on this paper, 2019). These regional institutions focused on ‘traditional’ trade 
as Latin Americans attempted to extend the most often failed national import substitution to a 
region-wide import substitution (for bigger markets) in order to save the enormous amounts of 
money invested in import substitution projects.  
European integration was set as kind of a standard, groups of countries all around the world 
attempted to repeat the ‘European success’ and establish similar institutions. Which were the 
most important characteristics of this first wave? Basically, features are determined by what 
integration theorists thought about successful integration and what the process of European 
integration showed. 
Homogenous membership. In the first wave of regionalism, regional organisations collected 
members of rather similar size, population, economic power, level of development and standard 
of living. The idea was that similar members could be integrated faster and easier, so 
homogenous membership was necessary or kind of a prerequisite of successful and deep 
regional cooperation.  
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Deep institutionalisation. Following the model of the European integration, institution-building 
was rather strong in this first phase, inter-state cooperation was regulated and supported by the 
establishment of different organs responsible for different functions and topics. Sophisticated 
institutions guaranteed regular participation of all the members and created a strong framework 
for settling possible challenges and conflicts between the member states. 
Protectionist trade policy. To develop trade relations and increase the volume of inner trade was 
an essential objective in the first wave, therefore trade and non-trade barriers were eliminated 
between member states, while trade with third countries followed very similar rules and 
standards. This resulted in an inward-looking system, as it was easier for member states to trade 
with each other, than to trade with third countries, so members enjoyed an advantageous 
position compared to other countries. 
‘Positive’ integration. This means that in the first wave of regionalism, the motivation behind 
regional cooperation was to strengthen the role of sates, to make their regulating force stronger 
and to support state functions through the integration process. Attempts to establish 
supranational structures or to give certain state functions to the organisation were not on the 
table. Regionalism was perceived as a means to vindicate state interests and to implement a 
successful foreign policy. 
Specific objectives. In the first phase of regionalism, regional organisations were typically 
established to reach a certain objective, so these regional institutions usually focused on one 
given policy area, let it be security (which was rather usual in the case of Cold War institutions), 
trade or culture. Typical first wave regional organisations targeted economic cooperation and 
well-being. Of course, exceptions should be mentioned, too – the Organisation of American 
States or the League of Arab Nations emerged as typical multi-purpose organisations. 
In sum, first-wave regionalism resulted in failure and disappointments in most cases – these 
organisations could not reach their original goals, and members were far from satisfied with the 
results in most cases. Here you can see the examples of the first wave on a regional basis. It is 
important to emphasize that the characteristics described above are general ones, they are not 
valid in all single cases. 
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• Europe and the Eastern bloc: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO, 1949), 
Western European Union (WEU, 1954-), Warsaw Pact (1955-1991), Council of 
Europe (CoE, 1949-), European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom, 1957-), 
European Economic Community (1957-), Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (Comecon, 1949-1991) 
• Western- and East Asia: Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO, 1955-1979), 
South-East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO, 1954-1977), Association of 
Southern Eastern Asian Nations (ASEAN, 1967-) 
• American continent: Organisation of American States (OAS, 1948-), Rio Pact 
(1947), Central American Common Market (CACM, 1961-), Andean Group 
(1969-), Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM, 1973-), 
Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA, 1962-1980) – Latin American 
Integration Association (ALADI, 1980-) 
• Middle East: League of Arab Nations (1945-) 
• Africa: Organisation of African Unity (OAU, 1963-2002) - African Union (AU, 
2002-) 
 
Second wave of regionalism emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, as a result of various events and 
processes. Globalisation got more and more visible and had various consequences, so in a way, 
this second phase of regionalism might be defined as a response to this phenomena; regional 
structures emerged or existing regional frameworks got new impetus parallelly with 
intensifying globalisation.  
Which were those changes that contributed to the appearance of this second wave of 
regionalism?  
First of all, new opportunities of cooperation emerged, as decline of the East-West rivalry 
restructured inter-state relations and let regions to focus on their own development. The Cold 
War era guaranteed kind of a ‘protection’ for small, weak and less developed countries if they 
joined on of the blocs, but in the post-Cold War system, these entities were afraid of 
marginalization, they were threatened by being neglected in the international system, therefore 
they typically started to reinforce regional links in order to avoid to be left out. They hoped that 
regional embeddedness would help them to participate and become an integral part of the global 
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system. Regional cooperation seemed to be a rational choice for most of the actors in order to 
demonstrate their autonomy and prove that they are important actors of the international system.  
Globalisation in general is an essential motivation behind the second wave of regionalism, as 
the emergence of global challenges in the 1970s automatically resulted in stronger regional 
cooperation. Westphalian state-system faced serious dilemmas and it seemed that state 
authority and state sovereignty had serious limitations in the age of transnationalism. These 
developments urged states all around the world to build permanent and regular forms of 
cooperation in order to be able to manage global and regional challenges, such as spread of 
organised crime, terrorism, epidemics and migration. In this sense, second wave-regionalism 
might be interpreted as kind of a response or reaction to globalisation, an attempt to 
counterbalance its negative results. Great powers, such as the United States, regional powers, 
such as Brazil and developing countries all turned to the regional level and did not want to be 
left out from this phenomena in order to strengthen their status in the world and be more 
effective when it comes to global challenges. 
Economic changes in the 1980s and 1990s also led to strengthening regional links. Economic 
liberalization and the spread of free trade basically ‘forced’ countries to have closer regional 
links to be more competitive and appear as bigger markets in world economy. Outward-looking 
economics were on the rise and export-led growth became an often-applied model for states, 
these tendencies all led to closer connections between regional actors. The threat of lagging 
behind proved to be rather a strong motivating force in this wave of regionalism.  
End of the ‘third world’ was also an important reason behind reinforced regionalism; during 
the Cold War frameworks as Group of 77, the Non-Aligned Movement or Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) all built on South-South solidarity and common 
development, members wanted to get influence through stronger cooperation between high 
number of actors. By the 1980s, diversity of third world countries was a reality, and it resulted 
in different interests and motivations on behalf of these states, so the broad and loose institutions 
of the Cold War era lost relevance, while developing regions attempted to be more coherent to 
be able to have stronger influence.  
The process of democratisation should also be mentioned as a factor contributing to the 
emergence of second wave regionalism. Samuel P. Huntington describes three waves of 
democratisation: ‘The first "'long" wave of democratization began in the 1820s, with the 
widening of the suffrage to a large proportion of the male population in the United States, and 
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continued for almost a century until 1926, bringing into being some 29 democracies. In 1922, 
however, the coming to power of Mussolini in Italy marked the beginning of a first "reverse 
wave" that by 1942 had reduced the number of democratic states in the world to 12. The triumph 
of the Allies in World War II initiated a second wave of democratization that reached its zenith 
in 1962 with 36 countries governed democratically, only to be followed by a second reverse 
wave (1960-1975) that brought the number of democracies back down to 30.” About the third 
wave he writes: “Between 1974 and 1990, at least 30 countries made transitions to democracy, 
just about doubling the number of democratic governments in the world. … Five major factors 
have contributed significantly to the occurrence and the timing of the third-wave transitions to 
democracy:  
1) The deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian regimes in a world where democratic 
values were widely accepted, the consequent dependence of these regimes on successful 
performance, and their inability to maintain "performance legitimacy" due to economic (and 
sometimes military) failure.  
2) The unprecedented global economic growth of the 1960s, which raised living standards, 
increased education, and greatly expanded the urban middle class in many countries.  
3) A striking shift in the doctrine and activities of the Catholic Church, manifested in the Second 
Vatican Council of 1963-65 and the transformation of national Catholic churches from 
defenders of the status quo to opponents of authoritarianism.  
4) Changes in the policies of external actors, most notably the European Community, the United 
States, and the Soviet Union.  
5) "Snowballing," or the demonstration effect of transitions earlier in the third wave in 
stimulating and providing models for subsequent efforts at democratization. … Historically, 
there has been a strong correlation between Western Christianity and democracy. By the early 
1970s, most of the Protestant countries in the world had already become democratic. The third 
wave of the 1970s and 1980s was overwhelmingly a Catholic wave. Beginning in Portugal and 
Spain, it swept through six South American and three Central American countries, moved on 
to the Philippines, doubled back to Mexico and Chile, and then burst through in the two Catholic 
countries of Eastern Europe, Poland and Hungary. Roughly three-quarters of the countries that 
transited to democracy between 1974 and 1989 were predominantly Catholic.’ (Huntington, 
1991, pp. 12-13.) 
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Connection between democratic political systems and stronger regional cooperation is rather a 
debated issue till today. Originally Western authors emphasized that democracy supports more 
peaceful regional links and democracies are more willing to build stronger and more transparent 
regional institutions. Democratisation in Latin America during the 1980s and in Central Eastern 
Europe in the 1990s obviously contributed to the birth of new regional organisations and more 
active policy on behalf of these actors in regional forums. On the other hand, by today it is 
rather obvious that democratic political systems are not prerequisites of the emergence of 
regional organisations or deeper forms of regional cooperation, for example countries in the 
Middle East or Africa have shown willingness for closer regional cooperation in the last twenty 
years, although they have not reached the system of liberal democracy. Or the case of China 
could be mentioned – as Beijing has become more active in regional affairs since the 1990s, 
but it is still a one-party system. Another interesting question is whether regional organisations 
are more successful if they are formed by liberal democracies?    
Three different forms of second generation-regionalism can be distinguished. The first one is 
when already existing institutions move towards deeper integration or stronger unity. Several 
examples of this type could be mentioned, such as the Maastricht Treaty in the case of the 
European integration, establishment of the Andean Community (previously Andean Pact) or 
the Summit of the Americas process from 1994 in the framework of the Organisation of 
American States is also an example. The second type is enlargement; it is a typical consequence 
of the end of the Cold War as countries in the world got free of the East-West system dictated 
by Cold War logic. Most typically it meant that Central Eastern European countries joined the 
different regional organisations in Europe, such as the European Union or the Council of 
Europe. ASEAN also had new members in the 1980s and 1990s – Brunei joined in 1984, 
Vietnam joined in 1995, while Laos and Myanmar in 1997. These enlargements often resulted 
in much more heterogenous organisations, as we will see later. The third type of second wave-
regionalism was the establishment of totally new regional frameworks – examples will be listed 
below according to regions. These new institutions show somewhat different features compared 
to the regional organisations that emerged after WWII.  
Which are the characteristics of second generation-regionalism? First of all, it has to be 
emphasized that these features are not absolute meaning that they are not valid in all cases, they 
could rather be described as tendencies, relative innovations compared to the first generation.  
Heterogeneous membership. Probably the most important innovation of this second wave of 
regionalism was that countries of very different size, political power and economic strength 
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became members of the very same regional organisation. On the one hand, it resulted in more 
regular and institutionalised links between the developed, the developing world and the so-
called countries in transitions. The most obvious example is the North American Free Trade 
Agreement in 1994 with the membership of the United States, Canada and Mexico, three states 
with rather different level of development. On the other hand, heterogenous membership 
brought challenges of hierarchy, disequilibrium and lack of consent on ideas and objectives. In 
most cases, for less developed countries it seemed to be an opportunity that joining a regional 
economic bloc might bring development and prosperity for them. But rather, the model of two-
speed integrations emerged, describing the situation of a more integrated inner bloc surrounded 
by the new members facing serious barriers of ‘real’ integration and poor countries were often 
labelled as free riders and perceived as burdens. 
Lack of special treatment. As it was discussed above, in the case of first wave-regionalism, 
member states and non-member states were treated in different manner and more favourable 
terms in case of member states resulted in more coherence and deeper integration. By the 1980s 
and 1990s free trade and neoliberal economic policy became widespread as a result of 
globalisation, so special treatment could not really be maintained or was not as strong and as 
‘special’ as in the previous decades. Often developing countries were given longer period of 
time for adjustment, but special privileges were not guaranteed by membership as the whole 
world was going towards integration as a result of globalisation. 
Integration to world economy. First generation-regionalism often served as kind of a 
protection, in many cases – especially developing – countries wanted to be isolated in world 
economy thorough regionalism in order to lessen their dependence on developed partners. 
Second wave-regionalism had a very different logic as these new forms of integration wanted 
to integrate into world economy in a more effective way, so in many cases member states hoped, 
that in a wider regional framework – as bigger markets, more attractive targets of investments 
– thy could be more successful in world economy as on their own. So, regional autarky was 
replaced by an outward-looking attitude, that is why second generation-regionalism is often 
called ‘open regionalism’ emphasizing that this is the most important innovation of new 
regionalism – which is another expression describing regionalism of the 1980s and 1990s.  
Multi-dimensional integration. Forms of new regionalism often go much further than simply 
making trade between members more intense, they attempt to deepen cooperation in different 
fields, such as politics, development, protection of human rights, environmental issues, 
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education, migration, etc. Borders of these issues are less clear today, as they are more 
intertwined with each other, so cooperation easily ‘spreads’ to new fields.  
Participation of non-state actors. As importance of non-state actors increase in international 
relations in general, it is not surprising that involvement of non-state actors in regional affairs 
is also on the rise. Originally, regional organisations operated on an inter-state basis, but in the 
second wave more and more NGOs (non-governmental organisations) and social movements 
worked actively in regional organisations. This phenomena is closely linked to the fact, that 
second generation-regionalism is a much more spontaneous, ‘from below’ process compared to 
the typical ‘from above’ structure of the 1950s and 1960s, when inter-governmental links 
dominated the regional organisations. 
‘Loose’ institutions. Compared to the first wave, new forms of regionalism in the second wave 
show much looser institutions with lack of any attempt at supranationalism. An explaining 
factor is that actors from the non-Western world got much more active in the second wave, and 
their attitude towards state sovereignty is rather different than that of developed states – based 
on the experiences of colonialism and other historical events. Regarding institutions we can see 
kind of a contradiction in the sense that on the one hand institutions get more sophisticated in 
many already existing organisations, while on the other hand, parallelly with these, new 
regional frameworks with the involvement of members from the developing world rather show 
a model of regular regional forums with less detailed and fixed institutional background. 
Mercosur is a typical example in the 1990s or the North American Free Trade Agreement that 
does not build regional organs till today. 
More direct North-South links. As a result of the features described above, new regionalism 
offers an opportunity of regular meetings and cooperation between members of the developed 
and developing world. Therefore, developing countries often perceive new regionalism as 
measures to give them permanent presence, stronger position and stronger bargaining power in 
these regional frameworks. As group of developed and developing countries are both more and 
more heterogeneous, these lines are not obvious today, and regionalism supports the process of 
finding common grounds and common objectives. (Inotai, 1994. pp. 28-30.) 
Altogether, new or open regionalism ‘implies a stronger emphasis on the political dimensions. 
Regional organizations which emerged after the Second World War, whether economic or more 
security oriented, were usually organized from above and from outside the region. The new 
regionalism is emerging in a post-Cold War context, in a situation where 'national' economies 
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are outgrowing their national polities. It is, furthermore, a world wide phenomenon, although, 
just like in the first wave, it started from Europe. It can be defined as a world order concept, 
since any particular regionalization process has systemic repercussions in individual regions 
throughout the world.’ (Hettne, 1994, p. 2) 
Here you find the examples of new regionalism in the world: 
• Europe: Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) / 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE, 1975-), EU 
(1992-), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (1991-) 
• Asia and Pacific region: Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC, 1989-), 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF, 1994-) 
• Middle East: Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC, 1981 
• Latin America: Southern Common Market (Mercosur, 1991-), Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA, 1994-), North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA, 1994-) 
• Africa: Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS, 1975-), 
Southern African Development Community (SADC, 1992-), Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA, 1993-) 
 
Third wave regionalism. Parallelly in time with second-wave regionalism, in the 1990s – as it 
was discussed above – regional groupings started to look outward as global players and relations 
between regions became a new dimension in international relations and a new level of global 
governance. 
The next part discussing the phenomena and theoretical background of inter-regionalism is from 
an article of mine published in the journal ‘Society and Economy’. The idea of multiregionalism 
anticipates a world order based on global regionalization where systematic relations emerge 
between regional organizations of the world, which can ultimately become a new level and 
efficient form of global governance (Van Langenhove – Costea – Gavin 2004). This future was 
forecast by Guy Verhofstadt in September 2001 saying that G8 should be replaced by a G8 
having a more satisfactory regional representation where representatives of EU (European 
Union), AU (African Union), Mercosur (Common Market of the South), ASEAN (Association 
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of Southeast Asian Nations) and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) would have 
an equal position for negotiation (Söderbaum – Van Langenhove 2005). For the time being 
regional groupings are not likely to take over the place of nation states, inter-regional 
frameworks, however, become increasingly important and diverse therefore their significance 
in the international system is expected to grow.  
The main innovation of inter-regionalism was that while the first two generations of regionalism 
emphasized the strengthening of the regions inside, third generation integration includes 
relations outside regions and the harmonization with other regions. In this wave of regionalism 
therefore the regions are ‘looking outward’ and initiating agreements on various topics with 
other regions. In the beginning the European Union was the ‘leader’ of this phenomenon but 
today integration blocks in other continents (inter alia ASEAN and Mercosur)  are increasingly 
active in approaching other regions (Van Langenhove – Costea 2005). 
Inter-regional relations are the logical and chronological consequence of regional integration. 
It is about how the institutions of new, open regionalism build relations with each other. So at 
this wave of regionalism geographical proximity loses its importance. The reasons for 
institutionalization of interregional relations are the following: there is some kind of 
systematization of the more and more complex and interdependent world and this is a way in 
which regions are wishing to compensate the alliances of other regions (Hänggi 2000). 
In the beginning the European integration’s so called group to group concept formed the basis 
of thinking in the region. In the 1990s the third generation of regionalism basically meant the 
relation system of the so called members of the Triad. The basic of the Triad concept was 
formed by the trilateral relations between the USA, the European Communities and Japan – the 
three powers of capitalist world economy – during the Cold War period. In the meantime this 
concept has changed referring to the relation system of three regions (North America, Western 
Europe and East Asia). In the last decades of the twentieth century the members of the Triad 
accounted for three quarters of global trade, 90% of FDI and also 85% of the world’s GNP 
(Hänggi 2000). APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) established in 1989, New 
Transatlantic Agenda of 1995 between the USA and the European Union, Transatlantic 
Economic Partnership of 1998 and finally Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) between Western 
Europe and Asia launched in 1996 meant the basic frameworks for inter-regionalism. These 
inter-regional groupings linked the members of the Triad boosting their position in global 
economic processes.   
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After the Millennium, however, regional groupings of the developing world also began to 
participate in building global inter-regionalism. One of the major reasons for this is the 
increasing fragmentation of the developing world both in terms of political influence and 
economic performance. The strengthening and dynamic economic growth of the so called 
emerging powers seem to pose a real challenge to the global order dominated by Triad 
members, in that they appear as new centres of power, even building their own regional groups 
to support themselves. The strengthening position of emerging powers is a prime factor 
concerning the uniform opinion of the international literature relating to the twenty-first century 
world order moving towards multipolarity. While in the 1990s the issue of unipolar/multipolar 
world order was in the centre of debates, today the latter scenarios seems relevant and the debate 
revolves rather about where poles and the centre of these poles will be. Not surprisingly, 
emerging powers and members of the developing world are more and more active in building 
inter-regional relations, as on the one hand this is a prerequisite for strengthening their positions 
and on the other hand it enables them to participate in global governance more powerfully than 
ever before, and for developing countries in can be useful for the purpose of avoiding 
marginalization (too). In the 1990s the European Union – continuing its policy of the previous 
years – strengthened its relations with Africa, Asia and Latin America but now we can see that 
the emerging powers of these continents will be active initiators especially when building 
relations outside the Triad.  
Based on the above inter-regional relations can (also) be categorized as follows: inter-regional 
relations inside the Triad; between a triadic member and a different region in the world; between 
non-triadic members. The last type of relations is still in its infancy, it is more like first attempts 
or getting to know each other rather than building institutionalized relations. For this reason the 
theories describing inter-triadic relations cannot really be applied for these relations, studying 
them, however, is relevant because they are expected to strengthen and inter-regional 
cooperation will have typical traits the same way as integrational groupings of other regions 
have their own specific traits in comparison with the European Union. 
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Three Waves of regionalism 
 When Features Actors Examples 
Old regionalism 1950s-1970s inward looking 
policies, 
protectionism, 
deep institutions 
States with 
similar 
economic and 
political 
background 
EEC, Andean 
Group, NATO, 
ASEAN, CoE 
New/open 
regionalism 
1980s- extrovert policies 
with the aim of 
integration into 
world economy, 
free trade, 
minimal state 
intervention, loose 
institutions, 
multiple 
objectives 
States with 
geographical 
proximity 
EU, Mercosur, 
NAFTA, OSCE, 
AU 
Inter-regionalism 1990s- looking outward, 
strengthening 
cooperation with 
other regions, 
multiple 
objectives, 
geographical 
proximity loses 
importance 
States, regions, 
subregions, 
regional 
organisations 
APEC, ASEM, 
FEALAC, EU-
Mercosur, China-
CELAC 
Constructed by the author 
Hänggi’s often referred categorization distinguishes three groups of inter-regional relations 
(Hänggi 2000):  
A) Relations between regional groupings. These can be considered the prototype of inter-
regional arrangements, a relationship that is closely linked to ’old regionalism’. Examples are 
the EU-Mercosur, EU-Andean Community, EU-Rio Group, ASEAN-Mercosur, ASEAN-Rio 
Group, and CER (Closer Economic Relations, a free trade agreement Australia and New 
Zealand)-Mercosur relations.  
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B) Biregional and transregional relations. They are a rather recent phenomenon in 
international relations. Membership in these rather heterogeneous arrangements is more diffuse 
than in traditional group-to-group dialogues; it does not necessarily coincide with regional 
groupings and may include member states from more than two regions. Examples are APEC, 
Europe-Latin America Forum, Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC) 
and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).  
C) Hybrid systems. These are relations between regional groupings and single powers in other 
worldregions. Relations between China and Latin America for example give this form of 
interregional cooperation, like China-Mercosur, China-Community of Latin American 
Countries (CELAC) and China-Pacific Alliance (PA) cooperation. 
Actors of inter-regionalism seem difficult to be defined and grasped; they can be states, regional 
organizations/groups and regions. The term region requires here a flexible interpretation 
relating to a continent, geographical area or areas difficult to define such as Latin America. In 
the case of interstate relations actors form their opinions, take part in negotiations through 
working, old-established mechanisms, as to inter-regional relations the internal structure of 
actors is mostly under development and change, so most of the time common actions are 
difficult to take and require preliminary internal negotiations. Another important feature is that 
inter-regional relations are often asymmetric because mostly regions with different level of 
development are connected. The fundamental question influencing the future impacts of inter-
regionalism is how much the initiator emerging powers will follow the traditional centre-
periphery relation between developed-developing countries in their inter-regional relations and 
how much they will be able to move beyond that.    
The difference between inter-regionalism and inter-regional cooperation depends on the 
existence or lack of institutions. Although the two phenomena are difficult to separate and in 
my opinion it is not even worth it because of the diversity of actors on the one hand and because 
the actions of emerging states (and the developing world in general) show that the inter-regional 
relations they build are looser, without institutions and often ad hoc, on the other (e.g. BRICS 
– Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, IBSA – India, Brazil, South Africa forums). 
We should not exclude these formations from the study of inter-regionalism since considering 
world economy trends emerging powers are expected to become ever more active builders of 
inter-regional relations, moreover the so called hybrid forms begin to take over the European 
practice following the group to group concept: for example the annual EU–Brazil and EU–
China Summit. A general feature is that inter-regional relations today – as yet – miss actual 
43 
 
institutional frameworks instead there are regular ministerial meetings i.e. forums which 
systematize the relations of each regions/regional groupings. We can see that an important 
feature of inter-regionalism is the diversity of actors and the diversity of cooperation forms.    
The literature on this phenomenon1 has only reached the surface of the process, since the 
contours are misty, and it is by far not a linear, even process. Some authors state that inter-
regionalism is one of the most focused and regulated form of globalization (Hettne 2004), which 
can be an important handhold and framework in today’s world order/disorder. Researchers 
agree that inter-regionalism is a long term, uncertain, but irreversible process. End product 
could be multiregionalism that would mean a new, regionalized form of multilateral world order 
in which inter-regional relations dominate. Today agreements among regions are voluntary and 
cooperative, but in the future these could be institutionalized which would affect the structure 
of world order (Hettne 2005). 
The future direction and frameworks of inter-regionalism will highly depend on how much the 
triadic members will be interested in building inter-regional relations, how much they will 
promote the strengthening of inter-regional frameworks. The geopolitical and geoeconomic 
position of regions outside the Triad will fundamentally be defined by how successful their 
inter-regional relations with each triadic member and with each other will be. The significance 
of inter-regionalism beyond the Triad lies in that it can open a new chapter in South–South 
cooperation, if cooperation between these regions receives a systematic structure supported by 
active participation of emerging powers, which can help disadvantaged countries catch up (or 
at least hang on, provided that they are part of the system), may extend economic opportunities 
and the political influence of these regions.    
 
I.9 Globalization and regionalization 
 
Globalization and regionalization are two parallel and intertwined phenomena. Although there 
exists a globalization vs. regionalization debate, it is worth exploring the links between the two 
to have a deeper understanding of global and regional tendencies as forces of the two can not 
be separated. As a starting point, it is important to understand, that globalization and 
                                                          
1 Researchers studying inter-regionalism are mainly representatives of new regionalism’s research, e. g. Hänggi, 
Hettne or Söderbaum. This is because of the relatively short time period between the second and third wave and 
the fact that many features of inter-regionalism are logical consequences of the characteristics of new regionalism.  
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regionalization have a strong presence at the same time and they are complementary and 
contradictory at the same time.   
‘The inexorable forces of globalization and regionalization have reshaped the world economic 
landscape over the past quarter century. Global trade and financial flows have registered 
unprecedented growth during this period. Intra-regional economic linkages have also become 
much stronger with the proliferation of regional trade agreements and common currency areas. 
There have been profound changes in the volume, direction, and nature of international trade 
and financial flows over the past quarter century (…). These changes certainly have global 
dimensions, but at the same time they have also been driven by regional forces. First, while 
global trade flows have been growing at a much faster rate than world output, intra-regional 
trade flows have been playing an increasingly more prominent role in global trade. This reflects, 
in part, the process of economic unification in different regions and some emerging economies’ 
(e.g., China, India, and Korea) rapid growth during the past quarter century. In addition, intra-
regional trade and financial linkages have further strengthened by the explosion in the number 
of regional trade agreements (from 5 in 1985 to 200 in 2011). Second, intra-industry trade flows 
have contributed significantly to the unprecedented increase in global trade during the past two 
decades. These flows have grown rapidly in certain regions, including North America, Europe 
and Asia. International vertical specialization, which refers to the fragmentation of production 
processes into sequential chains in multiple countries, has been a major factor fuelling the 
substantial increase in global trade flows. This has led to a significant rise in the ratio of trade 
to value added in North America, Europe, Asia, and some parts of Latin America (…). 
Moreover, the volume of global financial flows has reached unprecedented levels since the mid-
1980s overshadowing the increase in global trade over the same period. Intra-regional flows 
have also been on the rise for the past 15 years, especially in Europe and Asia. Financial flows 
among advanced economies have still been the main driving force of the increase in 
international financial flows, but there has also been a significant rise in flows between regions 
with advanced countries and those with developing economies over the past 25 years.’ (Hirata 
– Kose – Otrok, 2013. pp. 4-5) 
Globalization and regionalization both ‘form new institutions in the global economic space 
which determine the actions of macroeconomic subjects, thus there is transplantation of 
institutions in most developed countries, which in turn causes a strong socio-economic 
dependence of recipient countries, hinders their development and enhances the technical -
economic underdevelopment, reduces welfare, and increases economic and political risks. 
45 
 
These problems could be solved by the development of modern market institutions at the 
regional level, especially in innovative and investment area.’ (Matveev – Valieva – Trubetskaya 
– Kislov, 2016. p. 3115)  
Parallel institutions are often less effective and hinder coherent development. Regional trade 
agreements (RTAs) are often perceived to be obstacles of successful negotiations in the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) framework. RTAs have their own objectives, agendas and 
mechanisms which often do not fit into the global level mechanisms. Another ‘result’ of FTAs 
is that members are often able to act together and struggle for their interests in multilateral 
forums as their bargaining power is stronger. On the other hand, emergence of RTAs might 
support the multilateral trade system, because number of actors might diminish leading to easier 
decision making. Regional blocs might be able to articulate their interest and together influence 
the agenda of multilateral forums and make them more effective. 
Similar interrelation is perceived between national, regional and global security issues. A 
visible and obvious example is international migration. Perception of migration might be 
different at the national, regional and global level. Although migration is an important issue at 
the regional level, regional structures and institutions rarely regulate the flow of migrants and 
refugees – the European Union is an exception, although it clearly shows the deep conflicts 
between the national and the regional level. Similar tendencies are seen at the global level: ‘On 
19 September 2016 Heads of State and Government came together for the first time ever at the 
global level within the UN General Assembly to discuss issues related to migration and 
refugees. This sent a powerful political message that migration and refugee matters had become 
major issues squarely in the international agenda. In adopting the New York Declaration for 
Refugees and Migrants, the 193 UN Member States recognized the need for a comprehensive 
approach to human mobility and enhanced cooperation at the global level. 
Annex II of the New York Declaration set in motion a process of intergovernmental 
consultations and negotiations towards the development of a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly 
and Regular Migration. This process concluded on 10 December 2018 with the adoption of the 
Global Compact by the majority of UN Member States at an Intergovernmental Conference in 
Marrakesh, Morocco, followed closely by formal endorsement by the UN General Assembly 
on 19 December. 
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The Global Compact is the first inter-governmentally negotiated agreement, prepared under the 
auspices of the United Nations, covering all dimensions of international migration in a holistic 
and comprehensive manner. It is a non-binding document that respects states’ sovereign right 
to determine who enters and stays in their territory and demonstrates commitment to 
international cooperation on migration.’ (IOM, 2019) The Global Compact brought serious 
criticisms at the national level, five countries (the United States, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Israel) voted against it, while twelve countries abstained. As a politically sensitive 
issue, it perfectly symbolizes the limitations of harmonious cooperation among the national, 
regional and global level. 
Regional blocs are not coherent and unified entities that are able to give a single voice, and they 
often act against the perceived negative consequences of globalization. On the other hand, states 
and governments often feel threatened by the forces of globalization and/or they feel themselves 
as ‘losers’ of regional blocs they belong to. These contradictory perceptions create a situation 
where the national, regional and global levels of governance are rather competitors and can 
hardly reinforce each other – which could also be the case. 
 
I.10 Research on regionalism 
 
Research on regionalism was initiated in the early fifties, when Western scholars attempted to 
describe the origins and evolution of regional integration, especially focusing on the case of the 
European integration. In the beginning a strong legal attitude dominated the research on 
regional organisations targeting the analysis of bodies, functions, voting procedures, etc. of 
these new actors in the world. Analysis on the European integration found formal organisational 
structure with distinct budget, a complex voting procedure and a high level of transparency and 
monitoring. Till today the European case is characterized by burocratic institutions and a dense 
network of legal regulations that have a relatively direct impact on state sovereignty. From the 
1960s state research on regionalism started to focus on comparative analysis between case of 
the European Economic Community and other regional organisations established on other 
continents (see above).  
The starting point of these analyses were that the European integration is the most ‘developed’ 
example of regionalism serving as kind of a model for the rest of the world and it treated the 
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issue of regionalism as an evolutionary process (reflecting the later ideas of Björn Hettne 
discussed above). It was supposed that regional organisations outside Europe all attempt to 
reach a similar regional structure as the EEC. Later on, from the 1980s and 1990s, when second 
wave regionalism emerged, it became rather obvious that these new forms do not follow the 
line of the European integration (especially not the way of the European Union). As a result, 
the idea of regionalisms appeared meaning that research started to focus on the analysis of the 
different features of regional organisations in Latin America, Asia and Africa, so the attitude 
that these regional organisations should be examined on their own, got rather widespread. This 
new approach attempted to describe the regionalism as a phenomena closely linked to the 
historical and cultural background, geostrategic situation, economic opportunities and political 
leadership of the given region and actors in the region. Consequently, it is rather unrealistic to 
assume that they would follow a similar way of regional cooperation and integration, so 
comparative analyses is rather useless. 
From the perspective of global governance, regional organisations are essential actors. The 
Commission on Global Governance defined global governance as ‘the sum of the many ways 
individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing 
process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative 
action may be taken. It includes formal … and informal arrangements that people and 
institutions have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest’ in 1995.  Global governance as an 
expression and as a phenomena has reached growing importance in international relations of 
the 21st century resulting from the more and more visible consequences and impacts of 
globalisation. 
Global governance has various pieces or elements, such as: 
• International structures and mechanisms (IGOs and NGOs) Most IGOs are not 
global, but have a regional scope, and based on common interests states are motivated 
to cooperate on issues important for them. 
 
• International rules and laws (multilateral agreements, customary practices, judicial 
decisions, regulatory standards) The scope of what is generally mentioned as public 
international law has expanded significantly since the end of WWII. International 
conventions show an extreme variety of topics, such as human rights law, trade and 
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investment law, non-proliferation, whaling, climate change, migration, humanitarian 
issues and so on. 
 
• International norms or soft law (framework agreements, UN resolutions) Many 
international legal conventions mean non-binding obligations for states, these are in fact 
norms and often labelled as ’soft law’.  
 
• International regimes (rules and norms, as well as practices of actors to show both 
how their expectations converge and their acceptance of and compliance with rules – 
governance without government)  
 
• Ad hoc groups, global conferences These are less permanent forums giving 
opportunity for discussion of certain topics. Examples are the UN conferences or world 
summits from the 1970s, such as the Summit for Children (New York, 1990), the Earth 
Summit (Rio de Janeiro, 1992) or the Climate Change Conference (Bali, 2007). 
Examples of ad hoc groups are G8 or G20. (Karns – Mingst – Stiles, 2015, pp. 25-30) 
 
Most of these elements have regional importance and regional structures; besides the widening 
network of regional international organisations all around the world, the regional (European, 
American and African) regimes of human rights, the regional nuclear-weapon-free-zones 
(covering Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa and 
Central Asia with the following treaties: Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1967; Treaty of Rarotonga, 1985; 
Treaty of Bangkok, 1995; Treaty of Pelindaba, 1996; Treaty of Semipalatinsk, 2006) and inter-
regional groups, such as BRICS (consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) 
or the Group of 20 are all examples. 
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This map shows regional nuclear-weapon-free-zones in four continents 
 
Source: https://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/nuclear-weapon-free-zones-regional-security-
middle-east-north-east-asia-europe/ 
 
The following table gives a good description of how regional structures have emerged in the 
system of global governance and influence processes especially in the field of economics and 
trade regulation. It proves rather an obvious shift from dominance of wider structures in the 
post-WWII era to the present situation of parallel existence and operation of global and regional 
frameworks: 
 
The development of global governance 
Identified externality Postwar Now 
Macroeconomic 
management 
spillovers/coordination 
IMF (adjustable peg system) G7, European Union/EMU 
(OECD, IMF) 
Rules for promoting liberal 
trade 
GATT WTO 
Regional customs unions and 
free trade areas 
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Rules for direct foreign 
investment 
UN WTO, OECD, European 
Union, World Bank (MIGA) 
Systemic stability for capital 
markets and international 
banking 
(Exchange controls) Self-regulation (IOSCO), 
BIS (IMF) 
Economic development World Bank (UN) World Bank, IMF, Regional 
banks 
International environmental 
spillovers and agreements 
UN agencies and ILO UN agencies (e. g. UNEP and 
WMO), Regional agreements 
Standard setting  Self-regulation, ISO, 
Regional agreements (EU 
Single Market), (WTO), (UN 
Agencies) 
Network management UN Agencies (ICAO, WMO, 
ITU) 
Internet, UN agencies plus 
private self-regulation 
Commodity price stability (UN – commodity control) Regional agreements, Self-
regulation (OPEC) 
Source: Cable, Vincent: Globalisation and Global Governance, 1999. Chatham House Papers, p. 47 
Relations between global and regional governance is a debated question: are these 
complementing or competing structures? How could they be more effective? Basically, it raises 
similar questions as already discussed above regarding the debate between universalists and 
regionalists.  
Regarding challenges and dilemmas of today’s and future multi-level governance, here is a 
good summary from 2005: ‘This emerging multi-level governance calls for new ideas and 
practices to organise governance at local, national, regional and global levels and deal with 
questions of:  
1. How to co-ordinate policies at different levels of governance with supranational or macro-
regional organisations.  
2. How to make provision for the improved effective performance of multilateral institutions of 
global governance whose decision making is skewed by asymmetrical, or power influences or 
deadlocks—pace the contemporary UN or the WTO.  
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3. How to (re) organise regional representation of, and in, supranational organisations; such as 
the representation of the EU in international organisations like the UN.  
4. How to understand the main drivers towards regionalisation and to monitor the impacts of 
regional integration processes in Europe and in extra-European areas; especially the role of the 
EU governance model on developments in accession states and other near neighbours.  
5. How to understand the interface between supranational organisations, such as the UN, the 
OSCE, the CoE on the one hand and sub-regional state and local structures of governance on 
the other….’ (Richard Higgott, 2005) 
The role of regional organisations and further forms of regional cooperation in global 
governance gives a totally different perspective in research on regionalism, as instead of 
examining the institutions themselves it focuses on the influence of regional actors in a wider 
sense interpreting them as a relatively new and strengthening level of governance besides the 
global, national and local levels. 
One of the most essential question in research on regionalism is what makes a regional 
organisation or any form of regional cooperation successful? What is success and how is it 
measured? It is important to see, that regional organisations are established with various and 
rather different objectives. It is rather an easy way to evaluate regional organisations if original 
goals are taken into consideration and their achievement or lack of achievement is examined. 
Most regional structures focus on trade and economic relations – these objectives are the easiest 
to quantify: increase of the volume and share of inner trade, similar indicators with investments, 
per capita GDP, poverty rate, etc. are the most regular data taken into consideration. But of 
course, the opportunities of certain regions are extremely different, so these indicators are 
relative, can not be compared directly. Prevention of peace and conflict management among 
member states is another aspect that is often examined when regional organisations are 
evaluated. Another important factor might be, that how flexibly the given regional organisation 
is able to react to internal and external changes, whether it is able to create new practices, find 
new solutions to arising problems and challenges. Enlargement is an interesting issue in this 
case; on the one hand it suggests that the given regional organisation is successful as further 
countries apply for membership, while on the other hand, in many cases enlargement results in 
slower decision-making and less effective operation in general. 
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II Regionalism and security 
 
Traditionally, the issue of security in international relations focused on inter-state relations, first 
of all inter-state wars and conflicts. In the second half of the 20th century, the Cold War brought 
conflict between blocs (groups of countries), and security had a central role in this era under 
the logic of mutual deterrence that basically dominated the behaviour of the great powers during 
these decades. From the beginning of the 1990s, several regional conflicts have erupted (in ex-
Yugoslavia, ex-Soviet Union, Africa, etc.) that had been ‘frozen’ during the Cold War. So-
called ‘new security challenges’ also got more intense and limitations of state reactions were 
more and more obvious forcing states to open towards regional security cooperation to manage 
these challenges with joint efforts. Transnational security challenges, such as terrorism, ethnic 
conflicts, transnational crimes, natural disasters, migration or the spread of epidemics are 
different in nature and require different attitude on behalf of the states as they do not follow and 
‘respect’ state borders.  These developments all supported the more active and intense 
involvement of regional structures in conflict settlement and management. 
 
II.1 Regional security cooperation 
 
The United Nations is the most trustee of maintaining international peace and security. What 
role for regional organisations then? Historically, the first examples of regional cooperation on 
security issues are the following: ‘a number of independent commissions were formed during 
the 1800s and early 1900s, including the Central Rhine Commission (1816), the U.S.-Canada 
International Joint Commission (1909), and the U.S.-Mexico International Boundary 
Commission (1889). The Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine was established in 
1815 by the Congress of Vienna to mediate conflicts and negotiate agreements regarding trade 
and use of the Rhine; this early organization has been one of the most enduring regional 
organizations and has been central in the establishment of waterway regimes’. (Hansen et. al. 
2008, p. 297)  
First security architectures were the so-called European Concert targeting regional security with 
balance of power principle and the Monroe-doctrine in 1823, that had the objective to keep 
European powers out of the Western hemisphere. After WWII one of the consequences of the 
Cold War was the establishment of regional security organisations, such as the North Atlantic 
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Treaty Organisation (NATO, 1949), the ANZUS Treaty (1951) with the participation of 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States, or the Warsaw Pact (Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance) in 1955, which were typically defence organisations 
counting with external threats. After the Cold War, establishment of the Community of 
Independent States (CIS) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) brought new 
security structures that rather focus on new security challenges, such as terrorism or organised 
crime. Of course, already existing regional organisations (such as the European Union, the 
Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the Organisation of American 
States) are also reacting to these new challenges, creating new programs and organs to fight 
these phenomena. 
International peacekeeping and peacebuilding also have to be mentioned as this is a typical 
activity where during the last decades regional organisations have entered as new actors and 
seem to be more and more visible. Besides the EU and OSCE, the African Union is an important 
example – these regional organisations have considerable experiences in working together with 
the United Nations in international peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. Although the 
founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), were not willing 
to include conflict management in the founding document of the organisation, but they added 
conflict mediation to the organization’s functions (consultation and arbitration responsibilities) 
during the Summit in Bali (1976). 
By today, different models of regional security cooperation can be distinguished showing the 
diversity of the phenomena. These are alliances, collective security, security regimes and 
security communities. The most important features of these with examples are well introduced 
in SIPRI Yearbook, 2006. 
‘Alliances are one of the oldest forms of international cooperation, designed for both defence 
and attack (typically by military means) against a common external, or even internal, threat or 
opponent. They use cooperation as a means to an end rather than a good in itself, and an 
alliance’s membership necessarily excludes the enemy. These relatively zero-sum 
characteristics are matched by the often negative practical impacts of the alliance method on 
international security: even a purely defensive alliance may heighten its members’ threat 
consciousness more than it eases it, may exacerbate tensions and entrench dividing lines, and 
may take part in competitive arms acquisition. Alliances that turn on internal enemies (whether 
aberrant states or religious or ethnic groups) can also radicalize the latter and encourage them 
to seek external backers. On the other hand, an alliance should at least reduce the likelihood of 
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war between its members by promoting confidence, encouraging dispute avoidance and 
resolution, and perhaps triggering cooperation in other non-security areas. Both ASEAN and 
NATO may be seen as examples of this type of dynamic. Despite the ending of the classic East–
West confrontation in 1989–90, NATO and (albeit much less intensely) a number of other 
groupings continue to fulfil at least some of the roles associated with alliances.’  
It is interesting to see that ASEAN and NATO are both institutions that survived the Cold War, 
were joined by new members in the last decades, but they represent rather a traditional attitude 
on security challenges, so they react rather slowly to security dilemmas of the 21st century. 
The next model is collective security, that ‘emerged in the 20th century in response to the 
ambivalent effects of older-style balance-of-power politics and alliances. First attempted in the 
framework of the League of Nations and again in the United Nations (UN), a collective security 
system aims to prevent or contain war by assuring a response to any act of aggression or threat 
to peace among its members. To work as intended, any such system must include all states in a 
region or the world, and it directs its attention inwardly at their actions. Apart from the global 
UN, some larger regional entities—such as the AU, the OAS and the OSCE — may be viewed 
as institutions that explicitly or implicitly aim at, and at least partially produce, collective 
security. Notoriously, however, no such system has ever been made to work perfectly because 
of the evident problem—which is more difficult the larger the membership — of arriving at a 
common judgement and common will to act against offenders.’ (SIPRI Yearbook, 2006) The 
regional organisations mentioned here basically attempted to follow the idea and model of the 
United Nations on a regional bases – but in many cases they faced very similar limitations as 
the UN in maintaining peace and security.  
Emergence of security regimes is a later phenomena compared to the previous types of regional 
security cooperation, and their existence proves that regional security structure work and are 
able to create common norms and principles. ‘A security-related regime may cover broad 
prescripts for behaviour such as the non-use of force and respect for existing international 
borders, or may more concretely regulate certain types and uses of weapons or activities like 
military movements and transparency. Several regional constructs, notably the OSCE and some 
Latin American initiatives, may be understood as security regimes, as may regional arms 
control measures such as nuclear weapon-free zones or the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces 
in Europe (CFE) Treaty. The value of all such constructs depends on how well their norms are 
respected, and there is much debate on what features—in terms of internal power patterns, 
institutionalization, incentives and penalties—are needed to ensure observance. It should be 
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noted that regimes with functional security goals may not need, or lend themselves to, a 
geographically contiguous membership.’   (SIPRI Yearbook 2006) Although today regional 
security regimes are limited in scope, probably in the future they will spread to new areas and 
might involve further regions. 
At last, the more integrated form of regional security cooperation is a security community, 
which is ‘defined as a group of states among which there is a ‘real assurance that the members 
of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some 
other way’. The concept was developed by Karl Deutsch in the late 1950s to reflect the 
particularly far-reaching goals of post-World War II European integration, which in turn placed 
Europe in a larger security community of the world’s industrial-ized democracies. A security 
community implies more intense, sustained and comprehensive interaction than any of the 
above models. Starting by removing the risk of conflict within the group, it can develop 
strengths that are greater than the sum of its parts for security tasks going well beyond the 
prevention of specific ills. Ambitions to build such communities have recently been displayed 
also in several non-European regions, but the nature and effects of regional integration in the 
security domain remain poorly understood. The EU experiment has eliminated conflict between 
but not within its states (vide Northern Ireland and the Basque region). The tendency of security 
com-munities to weaken internal frontiers potentially means that they can be more quickly 
affected by ‘transnational’ threats (e.g., terrorism, criminal traffic and disease). Their open-
ended agendas tend to lead them to confront new security challenges as soon as old ones are 
settled and, in particular, to feel an impulse to start ‘exporting’ their surplus of security to others, 
notably in the form of peace missions ….’ (SIPRI Yearbook 2006) 
This model is rather far from the original concept of security alliance and as harmonious co-
existence between the members is given, it turns outward to serve as kind of a source of 
experience and good practice in maintaining peace and security in other regions. The fact, that 
the European integration is till today the single example of a security community means that 
this type of regional security cooperation might be a European development, that will not be 
followed by other regions. 
What is for sure, is that rather a high number of regional organisations have some kind of 
security dimension and this number is still on the rise. By today, institutionalised forms of 
security cooperation is apparent in all the world regions. The next table gives a good summary 
of these structures region by region. 
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Regional organizations and groups with security functions 
Organisation Year founded 
Africa   
African Union (AU) 2001 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA) 
1994 
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-
SAD) 
1998 
East African Community (EAC) 1999 
Economic and Monetary Community of 
Central Africa (CEMAC) 
1998 
Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) 
1975 
Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) 
1996 
Mano River Union 1973 
Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) 
1992 
Americas  
Andean Community of Nations (Andean 
Pact) 
1969 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 1973 
 
Central American Integration System (SICA) 1991 
Latin American Integration Association 
(LAIA) 
1980 
MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) 1991 
North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) 
1994 
Organization of American States (OAS) 1948 
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Rio Group 1987 
Asia  
Australia, New Zealand, United States 
(ANZUS) Security Treaty 
1951 
Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 1989 
Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
ASEAN Plus Three (APT) 
1967 
 
1994 
1997 
Conference on Interaction and Confidence-
building measures in Asia (CICA) 
1992 
Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) 1985 
Pacific Community 1947 
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) 1971 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) 2001 
South Asian Association for Regional Co-
operation (SAARC) 
1985 
Europe and Euro-Atlantic  
Arctic Council 1996 
Baltic Council 1993 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) 1993 
Organization of the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (BSEC) 
1992 
Central European Initiative (CEI) 1989 
Collective Security Treaty Organisation 
(CSTO) 
2003 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)  
1991 
Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) 1992 
Council of Europe 1949 
European Union 1951 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) 
1949 
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1997 
 
Nordic Council 1952 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) 
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe  
1973 
 
1999 
Southeast European Cooperative Initiative 
(SECI) 
1996 
Visegrad Group (V4) 1991 
Western European Union (WEU) 1954 
Middle East  
Arab League 1945 
Arab Maghreb Union 1989 
Council of Arab Economic Unity 1964 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 1981 
Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC) 
1971 
Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 2006. pp. 196-197. 
 
II.2 Regional organisations and international conflict management 
 
How is the effectiveness of regional organisations in international conflict management 
evaluated? Here is a good summary on this by Hansen mentioning the most important authors 
researching on this topic:  
‘Early literature suggested that regional organizations help reduce conflict by isolating and 
dividing local conflicts before they become intractable global issues (Burton 1962; Fisher 
1964). Regional organizations lack the perceived impartiality that global organizations gain 
from their distance, cited as necessary for viable mediation (Moore 1987). On the other hand, 
regional organizations may be more effective at mediating conflict because their member states 
share common interests that make their actions more timely and effective. Wehr and Lederach 
(1991) argue that mediators who are ‘‘closer’’ to the disputants are more likely to promote trust-
based mediation, which may be effective at creating more binding agreements.  
59 
 
A number of studies have questioned the accuracy of these claims and instead caution that 
regional organizations have only limited success at resolving the issues behind disputes (Nye 
1971; Meyers 1974; Haas 1983). … Like global organizations, regional organizations are likely 
to be most effective as conflict mediators when they are independent from their member states, 
they have sufficient resources to accomplish their goals, and their organizational charter 
includes more stringent methods of conflict mediation. Taking each of these factors in turn, 
Meyers (1974) has argued that a lack of centralized authority is a principal reason why the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) is only marginally successful at mediating conflict. This 
lack of independence has made the OAU dependent on member states voluntarily complying 
with agreements, and because of this, the OAU was only effective when both disputants in a 
conflict were member states and when leaders’ positions were not threatened by rulings of the 
OAU. Organizational resources may include material (money, peacekeeping troops), 
informational (expertise or a centralized bureaucracy), or ideational (legitimacy and 
impartiality) resources (Nye 1971; Meyers 1974).  
While regional organizations often possess less material or ideational resources than many 
global organizations, they do have an advantage in information. As Peck (1998) discusses, 
regional organizations, because of their proximity to the conflict and to the disputants, are able 
to more efficiently assess potential conflicts and direct their limited organizational resources to 
more effectively prevent and mediate conflict. The similarity of preferences between regional 
disputants and regional IO mediators enhances the credibility of informative signals sent by the 
IO (Thompson 2006, 7). Organizations will be most successful at resolving disputes if they can 
provide expert knowledge and an experienced diplomatic corps and can process information 
from a variety of sources (i.e., states, NGOs, research institutions) to make more effective 
recommendations. Furthermore, organizations can increase compliance with agreements if they 
can more effectively monitor disputant behaviours and offer advice to the parties in the dispute 
(Peck 1998). Finally, organizations with charters that include binding methods of conflict 
mediation, such as arbitration, are often more effective at resolving disputes (Nye1971; 
Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004; Mitchell and Hensel 2007). Bercovitch, Anagnoson, 
and Wille (1991) find that the more active a role the mediator takes in dispute resolution, the 
greater the chance of success of the mediation attempt. Organizations like the OAU may be 
able to provide ‘‘good offices’’ and act as a forum for state leaders and resolve interstate 
disputes in that matter, but they are likely to meet less success in creating and enforcing 
agreements than organizations such as the European Union, which can initiate binding 
60 
 
adjudication between member states—with or without member state approval.’ (Hansen et., 
2008) 
 
II.3 Regional Security Complex Theory 
 
When discussing regional security issues and regional cooperation on security challenges, the 
Regional Security Complex Theory has to be mentioned as it basically divides the world into 
regional security units and brings a new perspective to research on regional security 
cooperation. Barry Buzan writes about the evolution of the theory: ‘The original definition of a 
security complex (Buzan 1983 106) was: ‘a group of states whose primary security concerns 
link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot reasonably be considered 
apart from one another’. In our 1998 book (Buzan and Wćver 1998: 201), the definition of 
RSCs was reformulated to shed the state-centric and military-political focus and to rephrase the 
same basic conception for the possibility of different actors and several sectors of security: ‘a 
set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked 
that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one 
another’. This more complicated formulation does not change the underlying idea or the main 
properties of the concept. The central idea remains that substantial parts of the securitisation 
and desecuritisation processes in the international system will manifest themselves in regional 
clusters. These clusters are both durable and distinct from global level processes of 
(de)securitisation. Each level needs to be understood both in itself and in how it interplays with 
the other.’ (Buzan, Barry - Waever, Ole, 2003, p. 44)  
Birth of this theory reflects that when thinking about security issues and challenges, besides the 
national and global actors, the regional level participants should not be left out from analysis 
and the role of these regional security complexes is on the rise compared to the role of great 
powers or the global collective security system (UN)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
Regional security complexes in the world 
 
 
Armed conflicts by region and years 
 
Source: Uppsala University, https://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/667/c_667494-l_1-k_armed-conflict-by-region-
-1946-2017a.png 
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III Regionalism and development 
 
Despite the fact that development is often an essential motivation for regional institution 
building, especially in the case of the developing world, it is quite difficult to explore direct 
connections between the two and it is also challenging to describe the mechanisms of interaction 
between regionalism and development.  
An essential limitation is that development is quite a debated issue. What is development? 
Concepts and interpretations vary, and it makes development rather a controversial issue in 
international relations. In academic literature the ‘development debate’ is a conflict between 
the ‘orthodox’ and the ‘critical’ approach. These are contrasting views on the background and 
reasons of development and underdevelopment and they reflect the dividedness of countries 
and policy-makers on the issue of development.  
‘The orthodox approach largely follows the mainstream tradition, interpreting development in 
the Western, liberal manner. Measured quantitatively with economic statistics, development 
means increases in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita over time and rising level of 
industrialization (Sen, 1996). It involves the transition of traditional societies, which are 
agrarian and subsistence-based, into modern societies founded on wage labor, cash, and 
consumerism (Rostow, 1971). Markets are the preferred solution to poverty and 
underdevelopment because they have proven to be the most efficient way to promote economic 
growth, diversification, industrialization and production. Markets also efficiently distribute 
resources and generate significant levels of wealth. The quality of life for the poor improves as 
the economy expands.’ (Pease, 2012, p. 186).  
According to the orthodox approach the reasons behind poverty and underdevelopment are most 
often bad, inefficient, irrational, corrupt, etc. state policies and regulations.  A typical case is 
the protectionist trade policy or industrialization in sectors where the economy does not have 
comparative advantage. The obvious result – the orthodox approach goes – will be (and must 
be) failure as inefficient industries are supported by the state. This automatically leads to the 
production expensive, non-competitive export products that can not be sold in world markets. 
Governments should not intervene in the market, otherwise they scarify growth and efficiency. 
‘The obstacles to development in the orthodox sense include population growth, corruption, 
and excessive government spending. The poorest developing states have high population 
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growth rate, which undermine their economies’ sustainability. Corruption compounds the 
problem. Venal government officials steal millions in foreign assistance for personal gain while 
forcing MNCs to pay millions in kickbacks and bribes, thus deterring foreign investment. 
Excessive government spending to subsidize transportation, energy or prices of manufactured 
goods creates huge development deficits and massive debt. Many developing states are mires 
in a cycle of poverty and debt that undermines long-term, stable, sustained economic growth. 
Development can be accomplished only by introducing significant market reforms and reducing 
state intervention in the market’ (Pease, 2012, p. 186). This attitude towards the development 
issue is often rejected by developing countries as they perceive it as blaming them for their fate, 
as if it was only their fault to lag behind and suffer from poverty and underdevelopment. 
Dependency theory emerged in the 1960s in Latin America and it was the very first theory that 
rejected modernization theory and emphasized the limitations of development opportunities of 
development countries and referred to the responsibility of Western, industrialized countries. 
Critical approach theorists emphasize the importance of colonial history of the developing 
world and the consequences of colonialism and the remaining patterns of exploitation by the 
ex-colonizers. These historical events and their structural consequences for ex-colonies’ 
economies should be considered when talking about the reasons behind underdevelopment.  
Critical development theory authors argue, that ‘development is the process whereby other 
peoples are dominated and their destinies are shaped according to an essentially Western way 
of conceiving and perceiving the world. The development discourse is part of an imperial 
process whereby other peoples are appropriated and turn into objects. … The economic, social 
and political transformations of the Third World are inseparable from the production and 
reproduction of meanings, symbols and knowledge, that is, cultural reproduction. Considerable 
attention has been given to the analysis of the economic mechanisms of underdevelopment and, 
to a lesser extent, the social and political processes’. (Munck – O’Hearn, 1999, pp. 1-2) Later 
on, in the 1990s criticism of the critique emerged, the so-called post-development theory 
appeared, that basically rejected the idea of development – it went further as it did not offer a 
new perspective on development as the critical approach did, but rather it wanted to get rid of 
the term ‘development’ as a symbol of Westernization. Post-development authors often follow 
anti-globalisation attitude and are linked with social movements all around the world. 
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According to the critical authors, development is rather about how people are able to ‘meet their 
material and non-material needs through their own efforts’. (Pease, p. 187) Therefore, indicators 
used by the orthodox approach are useless to measure the essence of development. 
The debate on development described above is well represented in international organisations 
such as World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) or the UN Development Program (UNDP). These frameworks serve 
as forums of debate on development and attempt to find solutions for poverty and 
underdevelopment. World Bank and IMF basically were founded on the orthodox ideas of 
development, while the birth of UNCTAD and UNDP meant that the attitude and perceptions 
on behalf of the developing countries could also be ‘institutionalised’ in the UN family. 
What about regional organisations? Most regional institutions set development as a goal in their 
founding documents – though they focus on different topics. Here is a list of quotations from 
founding treaties collected by a World Bank publication (Shiff – Winters, 2003) 
 
Trade and income 
“To enhance the competitiveness of their firms in global markets” NAFTA, 1992 
“To create an expanded and secure market for the goods and services produced in their 
territories. To reduce distortions to trade” G3 Treaty (Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela), 1994 
“To modernize their economies in order to expand the supply and improve the quality of 
available goods and services, with a view to enhancing the living conditions of their 
populations” MERCOSUR Agreement, 1991 
Investment 
“To ensure a predictable commercial framework for production activities and investment” G3 
Treaty, 1994 
“Prerequisite for the stimulation of domestic, regional and foreign direct investment and the 
expansion, growth and the development of the economies of each member state and the region 
as a whole” Kinshasa Resolution on the Establishment of COMESA, 1998 
“A stimulus to the development of the national economies by expanding investment and 
production opportunities, trade, and foreign exchange earnings” Agreement on the Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area, 1992 
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Development 
“To ensure in particular that these arrangements encourage the development of the less 
advanced members of the customs union and the diversification of their economies” Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) Agreement, 1969 
Democracy and human rights 
“To involve the peoples of the Region centrally in the process of development and integration, 
particularly through the guarantee of democratic rights, observance of human rights and the rule 
of law” SADC Treaty, 1992 
“To strengthen democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic 
and social development, to combat poverty and promote greater understanding between 
cultures” Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 1995 
Inter-state regional institutions most often follow the ideas of the orthodox approach to 
development, therefore – as described above with the goals of the mentioned organisations – 
they believe that joining a regional integration would help them to increase trade with member 
states and also with non-member countries (especially in second-wave regionalism) and attract 
investments. They consider these opportunities as essential factors in economic development. 
Social movements and NGOs rather tend to focus on the critical approach in their activities 
helping people more directly in their everyday lives and trying to satisfy their needs based on 
their background, concrete situation and challenges. In many cases, these forms of regional or 
global cooperation go against the ideas of the orthodox model and attack exactly those 
institutions (such as free trade agreements) that are perceived as important tools of development 
in inter-governmental regional cooperation. The Zapatista movement in Mexico is a typical 
case as Zapatistas initiated an armed (and later peaceful) struggle on the day when the North 
American Free Trade Agreement entered into force, on the 1st January, 1994. 
It is rather impossible to evaluate regional organisations’ performance regarding development 
– first of all, because development means different things to different actors participating in 
regionalism. What is for sure, is that regional organisations in the developing world have not 
been able to change the status of these countries and make them developed. The success of the 
first Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) in East Asia – Hongkong, Taiwan, Singapore and 
South Korea – did not have any institutionalised regional background. The rise of China can 
not be connected to the support of regional cooperation either. 
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Still, regional organisations can show results in development, now regions outside Europe 
(Latin America, Africa and Asia) are examined very shortly from the perspective, whether 
development is central to regionalism in the given area and how thy attempt to achieve it. 
 
III.1 Latin America 
 
The Latin American region is maybe the most active in building regional organisations from 
the 1960s and their attitude is the closest to the orthodox development theory – in spite of the 
fact, that dependency theory is a Latin American invention. 
Regional organisations in Latin America mostly follow subregions geographically – Central 
America, the Caribbean, Andean region, South America, etc. 
 
 
Source: Wikipedia 
 
Historically, experience of the independence is crucial in Latin American regionalism; the 
‘Dream of Bolívar’ (strong and permanent regional cooperation among all the Latin American 
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states) failed in the 19th century, while the United States brought all the English colonies into 
one single country. For Latin American policy makers, the missed opportunity to be more united 
is often intertwined with developmental challenges in the region. The United States – which 
was able to create a single entity after independence followed a path of development that led to 
the group of developed states. Meanwhile, Latin America lagged behind and joined the group 
of developing countries resulting in deep frustration, so regionalism and stronger regional 
cooperation has been a revolving issue since independence. 
This is one of the explaining factors for the relatively high number of regional organisations 
targeting common development. As it is obvious from the picture above, Latin American 
countries are mostly members of more than one regional organisations, which reflects the desire 
not to be left out from any opportunity to develop. 
Emergence of new regionalism in Latin America was rather dynamic and led by different 
motivations. András Inotai collects these factors in four baskets of arguments: ‘(a) Latin 
American interests; (b) US interests; (c) common(ly felt) interests of the Western Hemisphere; 
and (d) external (or global) developments.’. Latin American interests are rather complex, first 
of all economic factors have to be mentioned. During the 1990s, Latin American countries 
carried out structural reforms following the prescriptions of the so-called Washington 
Consensus and  ‘opening up vis-a-vis the world has to be accompanied by a similar process 
between and among Latin American countries in order to avoid trade diversion from the region 
to other countries offering better market access conditions (…) The stabilization and adjustment 
policies had a number of common features and made use of similar or identical policy 
instruments. Therefore, it is supposed that national economies are not only stronger but also 
more homogeneous in their economic priorities than in the past.’ (Inotai, 1994. p. 65.) End of 
military dictatorships and the process of democratization strengthened regional trust and hence 
was a motivating factor in regional institution-building. Avoiding marginalisation in the global 
markets and to create conditions for successful adjustment to the global challenges of the 
nineties were also important factors. ‘Finally, Mexico's turnaround in favour of inter-American 
regionalism has to be mentioned. It has not only created a unique demonstration effect to be 
followed by others, but contains a strong psychological element by challenging the traditional 
pattern of Latin American political and cultural unity vis-a-vis the Northern neighbour 
representing different socio-cultural values.’ (Inotai, 1994, p. 66) Political and economic 
situation of the US in the post-Cold war era and its motivation to preserve its leading position 
in the world turned Washington’s attention towards the Latin American region. Rapidly 
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growing Latino share in US population and rapidly increasing purchasing power of Latin 
American societies were also important motivating factors of deeper regionalism in the Western 
Hemisphere on behalf of the US. Common interests can be defined as ‘Larger economic units 
usually possess higher bargaining power that may be crucial, if one considers the growing 
conflictive potential in the economic relations of internationally leading actors. Both Latin 
American and US interests are expected to be represented, recognized or protected more 
efficiently if the new regionalism takes shape.’ (Inotai, 1994. p. 67) External (global) 
developments also contributed to the rise of new regionalism in the Americas: first of all, 
developments in Europe (the Maastricht Treaty and the birth of the European Union), the 
appearance of Central Eastern European countries meant obviously new competitors for Latin 
America (Inotai, 1994. p. 68) and the economic rise of the Pacific region all lead to joint efforts 
to deepen regional integration in the Western Hemisphere. 
It is important to see, that Latin American political developments after 2000 (the so-called pink 
tide in the region) brought new, mostly left-wing governments in South America. Parallelly, 
US foreign policy initiated ‘War on Terror’ that was rather unpopular in Latin America, while 
new presidents in Latin America blamed Washington (and the IMF) for the social costs of 
structural reforms introduced in the 1990s. Therefore, in Latin America new types of regional 
alliances emerged, mostly in institutionalised form to give an alternative of the Western way of 
regional integration. Academic literature calls this phenomena ‘post-hegemonic’ regionalism, 
referring to the essential Latin American motivation to get rid of US influence and find a 
sovereign way of development.2  
A serious limitation of more intense trade and investment links between Latin American 
countries is that these economies are mostly competitive ones – they are fighting with each 
other for market share in the United States, the EU and Asian markets. Besides this, the relative 
backwardness of infrastructure in Latin America is also an important factor when it comes to 
increase in trade relations. For Latin Americans, external partners (the US, European countries 
and Asian partners) have always been more important, than regional ones – historically Latin 
American governments and business actors have always concentrated on building strong 
relations with extra-regional partners. 
 
                                                          
2 For more details see Pía Riggirozzi and Diana Tussie (ed.): The Rise of Post-hegemonic Regionalism. The Case 
of Latin America. Srpinger, 2012. 
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III.2 Africa 
 
Originally – after WWII – African regionalism focused on the issue of decolonization and fight 
against the apartheid regime in South Africa. As a result, the topic of development could only 
be added later to the ‘agenda’ of regionalism, after political independence was already a reality.  
A centrepiece of economic integration in Africa is the Treaty of Abuja, which was signed in 
1991, entered into force in 1994 and it created the African Economic Community (AEC) – a 
long term and ambitious project to make economic cooperation strong and permanent among 
the more than fifty African countries. AEC is already in operation and will be completed 
(meaning an economic and monetary union) by 2028 in principle. The idea behind AEC is that 
collecting the sub-regional economic integrations a united economic community would be 
created in Africa that could reinforce the continent’s bargaining power in global forums and 
would also serve economic development is member states.  
Regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa started to emerge in the 1970s, more than a 
decade before the establishment of AEC. ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African 
States) was established in 1975; SADC (South Africa Development Community) was started in 
1980; COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) goes back to 1981; Arab 
Maghreb Union, 1989; CENSAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan States) was created in 1998; 
EAC (East African Community) in 2000; IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development) in 1986 and ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States) in 1985. 
These are those RECs in Africa that are acknowledged by the African Union and treated as 
elements of the African Economic community. 
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Source: http://regionswatch.blogspot.com/2010/07/understanding-rationalisation-of.html 
 
 
This relatively high number of RECs in Africa proves the motivation for intense regional 
cooperation, but concrete results of these forms of integration are not convincing. Which are 
those factors that make effective regional integration in Africa difficult? 
An important challenge is overlapping membership in RECs in Africa; usually African states 
are members of two or more regional organisations. This means that they have to comply with 
different – often conflicting – duties resulted from membership and it significantly raises the 
costs of integration. In many cases, political will needed for the fulfilment of obligations is 
often missing on behalf of the governments involved. In sub-regional integrations economic 
connectedness of member economies is rather low, as most of them are exporters of natural 
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resources and thy target markets of developed countries. As a result, share of regional trade in 
most cases is rather limited; members’ economic structures are rather competitive than 
complementary. Regional trade is also challenged by – in a similar way to Latin America – the 
underdevelopment of regional infrastructure and communication. Regional organisations have 
very low budgets, officials working for them are underpaid and they are simply not able to 
influence the behaviour of member countries.  At last, but not at least, in the case of Africa there 
is no regional power that was able and willing to take the costs of integration (Szent-Iványi, 
2010, pp. 330-334) – as Germany in case of the European Union, the United States in OAS or 
Brazil in Mercosur. 
 
Overlapping membership in Regional Economic Communities in Africa 
 
Source: https://bedsidereadings.com/economics/what-are-the-benefits-of-african-integration/ 
 
III.3 Asia 
 
Regionalism in Asia is rather atypical as its core is given by Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) established in 1967 – that basically did not involve the most essential 
regional powers, like China, Japan or India. It was rather created to defend member states from 
the influence of regional powers. Asian regional powers were not initiators of regional 
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cooperation frameworks. In a similar way, as in Africa, Asian regionalism focused on political 
issues in the beginning and the topic of development appeared later, in the 1980s and 1990s.  
ASEAN plus Three (APT) cooperation process started in 1997 – with the involvement of China, 
Japan and South Korea, the most essential economic powers in the region. The first East Asia 
summit convened in 2005 widened the framework to ASEAN plus Six with India, Australia 
and New Zealand.  
 
 
Source: http://archive.the-ipf.com/anyone-for-alphabet-soup-a-guide-to-asia-pacific-regionalism/ 
 
As ASEAN Plus Three involves actors with substantial economic power in world economy, it 
has achieved important results in terms of free trade and investments. ‘ASEAN’s trade with the 
Plus Three Countries retained its momentum despites challenges derived from uncertainties in 
the global economy. Total trade between ASEAN and the Plus Three countries in 2017 
amounted to USD 807.3billion which accounted for 31.6 per cent of ASEAN’s total trade. In 
the same year, the total foreign direct investment (FDI) flows from the Plus Three countries 
into ASEAN reached USD 29.9 billion, accounting for 21,8 per cent of total FDI inflow to 
ASEAN. In order to strengthen economic cooperation among the APT countries, the East Asia 
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Business Council (EABC) which was established in April 2004 in Kuala Lumpur continues to 
strengthen cooperation among the private sector and entrepreneurs of the East Asia countries. 
The EABC launched the East Asia Business Exchange (EABEX) Portal at the 5th East Asia 
Business Forum on 18 June 2013 in Tianjin, China.’ (ASEAN, 2018) 
When discussing the attempts of Asian regional organisations to contribute to regional 
development, the – less known – CAREC program has to be mentioned, too. ‘The Central Asia 
Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program is a partnership of 11 countries and 
development partners working together to promote development through cooperation, leading 
to accelerated economic growth and poverty reduction. It is guided by the overarching vision 
of “Good Neighbours, Good Partners, and Good Prospects.’ (CAREC official website) 
The program is a proactive facilitator of practical, results-based regional projects, and policy 
initiatives critical to sustainable economic growth and shared prosperity in the region. Since its 
inception in 2001 and as of September 2018, CAREC has mobilized more than $32.9 billion 
investments that have helped establish multimodal transportation networks, increased energy 
trade and security, facilitated free movement of people and freight, and laid the groundwork for 
economic corridor development. 
CAREC 2030 provides the new long-term strategic framework for the program leading to 2030. 
It is anchored on a broader mission to connect people, policies and projects for shared and 
sustainable development, serving as the premier economic and social cooperation platform for 
the region.’ (CAREC official website) 
Regional integration process in Asia got a new impetus after the Asian financial crisis as 
countries in the region faced their vulnerability and economic interdependence. The role of 
China is extremely important today, Chinese attitude towards regional cooperation has been 
shifting from the role of a passive outsider to a more and more active regional leader. The ‘Belt 
and Road Initiative’ declared by the Chinese government in 2015 with a targeted end date of 
2049 will probably reinforce Beijing’s role in Asian regionalism and will also contribute to 
easier regional trade and investments. 
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Source: https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2018/09/04/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-opens-up-
unprecedented-opportunities/#6b71ca353e9a 
 
Compared to the case of Latin America and Africa, we can see that although institution building 
is ‘less developed’ in Asia, the results in increased regional trade and investments and 
developing infrastructure, East Asia has an advantage now resulting from the extremely active 
period of the last two decades. China as an economic powerhouse has taken a more active role 
giving impetus to the process of Asian regionalism. The future patterns of Asian regionalism 
might have global impacts in the next decade. 
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IV Regionalism and identity 
 
In research on regionalism, identity is a more and more often examined factor influencing the 
opportunities of regional organisations. First of all, the concept of identity has to be introduced; 
it has several meanings as different disciplines emphasize different aspects of identity. 
Some definitions from different authors and perspectives: 
  - who a person is, or the qualities of a person or group that make them different from 
others (Cambridge Dictionary) 
  - an internalized psychic system that integrates an individual’s inner self and the outer 
social world into a congruent whole (Psychology) 
  - Traits and characteristics, social relations, roles and social group memberships that 
define who one is (Oyserman-Elmore - Smith) 
  - Process of construction of meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute enabling people 
to find meaning in what they do in their life (Castells) 
Here is a picture showing the complexity of identity formation and the various factors 
influencing one’s identity. 
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An interesting issue regarding group identity is what constitutes it. Is group identity formed by 
those factors that are common, meaning that members of a certain group have something in 
common and on this basis they create an ‘imagined community’. Or, quite the contrary, group 
identity is formed by the sense of difference with regard to other communities, so the basis is 
given by the differences? 
 
IV.1 Globalization and identity 
 
 In the context of globalization, the phenomena of multiplying identities has become a reality, 
meaning that with the emergence of the ‘global village’ people get closer to other people, other 
cultures, other religions, social groups, communities, etc., they get familiar with these groups 
and as a result might build multiple, parallel identities at the same time. Technological progress, 
extremely rapid development of communication and social networks all contribute to the 
phenomena of multiplying identity.  
Manuel Castells distinguishes three types of collective identities in the context of globalization. 
The first type he calls ‘legitimising identity, which is constructed from the institutions and in 
particular from the state. For example, and without wishing to provoke, the French national 
identity, which is one of the strongest in Europe, is constructed from the French state. It is the 
French state which constructs the French nation, not the reverse. At the time of the French 
Revolution less than 13% of the current French territories spoke the language of the Île-de-
France. I would say that it is the only European national identity which was efficiently 
constructed from the state. … In contrast to the French case, the other great revolutionary 
nation, the American nation, constructed a strong national identity in which there were no 
traditional identity principles, and it did so based on the state and the Constitution and through 
the key elements of multiculturality and multiethnicity. 
The second type of identity is what I call ‘identity of resistance’. It is that identity in which a 
human collective that feels either culturally rejected or socially or politically marginalised 
reacts by constructing with the materials of its history forms of self-identification, enabling it 
to confront what would be its assimilation into a system in which its situation would be 
structurally subordinated. We can speak of national identity, but to express at that moment the 
extraordinary emergence of indigenous movements throughout Latin America. It is an identity 
which was asleep and which had not expressed itself with all the strength with which it is 
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expressing itself now. And the cause is that it is structured as a resistance to the marginalisation 
process in which the globalisation of a certain kind places them. Not all globalisation generates 
resistance, but globalisation does make certain social groups resist, and they resist with what 
they have because they cannot do so as citizens, because as citizens they are minorities that do 
not have their rights represented. 
The third type of identity that I have observed is what I call “project identity”. The project 
identity is structured based on a self-identification, always with cultural, historical and 
territorial materials. And although it is always with these materials, there is a project of 
construction of a collective and at that moment it can be a project of a national, generic, kind; 
for instance, the feminist or the ecologist movement as a project of construction of a citizenship 
of the rights of nature.’ (Castells, 2010, pp. 95-97)  
The last two types (protest- and project) identities are obviously results of globalisation and 
might connect people with rather different ‘original’ or national identities. Project identity is in 
many cases truly transnational, but in the case of reject identities, we can also observe that 
certain transnational groups protest against some negative consequences of globalisation – such 
as nationalist or anti-globalisation groups. The Zapatista movement in Mexico, for example, 
represent marginalised native people in Southern Mexico, but as a protest organisation – with 
a strong anti-globalisation stance – it has attracted many supporters identifying with their goals 
outside Mexico. 
So-called territorial identities are on type of collective identities and they are attached to a given 
geographical territory that is in connection with a group of people. Territorial identities are 
divided into further categories, such as local, regional, national, supranational and global. In 
this sense, regional identity refers to the regional level below the state level. On the other hand, 
from the perspective of regional organisations and institutions supranational identity is what 
matters, such as European or South American identity.  Relations between national and 
supranational identities is rather a debated issue, three models are used to describe and 
understand the links between them. The first one is the so-called ‘zero-sum model’ meaning 
that ‘Identification with one social group comes at the expense of identifying with other groups. 
Europeanness either will or will not gradually replace national, subnational, or other identities 
relating to territorial spaces.’ (Risse, 2002) The second on is the layered cake model, according 
to which ‘people hold multiple identities and it will depend on the social context of interaction 
which of these multiple identities are invoked and become salient.’ (Risse, 2002) It means that 
the given situation determines which level of someone’s identity will be the strongest. A 
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Hungarian born near Lake Balaton might have a strong identification with the Balaton region, 
so in Budapest he or she might have a self-definition of belonging to this part of the country, 
while on a soccer match between Hungary and France, Hungarian identity will come to the 
front. And when he or she attends China, he or she might feel closer to fellow European tourists. 
The third model is called the ‘marble cake model’ and it means that similarly to the previous 
model, ‘identities are invoked in a context-dependent way, but they enmesh and flow into each 
other in a such a way that one cannot clearly define boundaries between for instance, one’s 
Flemishness, Waloonness, Belgianness and one’s Europeanness.’ (Risse, 2002)  
When regional organisations and regional identity is discussed, the question can be raised: is 
regional identity necessary for successful regional organisations? Does regional identity 
support regionalism or regionalism supports regional identity? 
 
 
Source: https://www.debatingeurope.eu/2013/10/29/do-you-feel-part-of-a-common-european-
identity/#infographic 
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IV.2 The European Union and regional identity 
 
The European Union is a regional institution that builds regional identity consciously and this 
activity distinguishes it from other regional organisations and basically makes it rather an 
exception then a model to be followed. European values (such as freedom, respect of human 
rights, human dignity, democracy, rule of law, equality, etc.) give the core of this identity 
building and various symbols are used to reinforce these and make all the member societies 
committed to Europeanness. Symbols include the European flag, Ludwig von Beethoven’s 
Symphony No. 9. (being played on official events of the European Union and the Council of 
Europe), the day of Europe (9th May), the motto ‘United in diversity’ has been used since 2000 
and the Euro can also be described as a symbol of Europe. On the contrary, even in Europe, 
statistics prove that national identities are still much stronger than regional (in this case, 
European) identity. 
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It is rather eye-catching that two islands (the United Kingdom and Cyprus) stand on one of the 
edges in the above table – with the highest percentage of ‘only national identity’, basically 
meaning rejection of European identity, which might be an explaining factor of the Brexit 
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process, too. On the other edge, Germany and Luxembourg stand with the highest rate of those 
who have a primary European and a secondary national identity. It shows that Germans – 
leaders in the EU and those, who take the highest financial burden in the integration (of course 
next to important benefits) are rather committed to Europeanness and belonging to Europe form 
an essential part of their identity. In the case of Luxembourg, probably the low number of total 
population and the relatively high number of Eurocrats explain the results. 
 
 
Source: https://slideplayer.com/slide/8531632/ 
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Source: https://www.debatingeurope.eu/2013/10/29/do-you-feel-part-of-a-common-european-
identity/#infographic 
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V Future of regionalism 
 
In the 21st century, regional cooperations/integrations face several challenges. Dynamism of the 
1990s brought by the rise of new regionalism has slowed down, several regional structures have 
lost their relevance, especially in Latin America and Africa, while the Asian Pacific region has 
become more active in building regional structures. 
The role the European Union – as the only real and/or would-be-global-player today (Remarks 
made by András Inotai, 2019) – is essential till today regarding the future of regionalism. From 
the 1950s the European integration served as kind of a role model for other regional frameworks 
outside Europe, especially institutional forms have been copied – typically the Parliament for 
more democratic operation –, but measures such as gender quota have also been applied in other 
regions. As it was discussed earlier, success or effectiveness of a regional organisation is always 
difficult to measure, but if volume of internal trade or FDI, level of institutionalization, 
involvement of citizens, common law and regulations or identity building is taken into 
consideration, the European Union is absolutely the No. 1 regional institution. Share of intra-
EU exports among total EU exports were 64% in 2017, while 50% in the case of NAFTA and 
ASEAN is on the third place with 24% (see Annex, p. 93).  
On the other hand, evolution of regional frameworks do not follow the European Union in their 
contents, the example of the highly regulated EU is extremely far from other regional 
frameworks, it is rather an exception than a model to be copied. The idea that regional 
integrations go towards the structure and principles of the European integration does not seem 
to come true; the EU is rather a ‘champion’ of regionalism without real competitors. 
21st-century crisis of the European Union is a visible phenomenon, and this crisis is multi-
dimensional in nature. ‘The ‘age of crisis’ for the EU began in 2009-2010 with the onset of 
what quickly came to be called the euro or eurozone crisis. This crisis, whose severity has ebbed 
and flowed over the years that have followed, is the most obvious manifestation of the EU in 
crisis. It has threatened the very existence of one of the EU’s main policy achievements: the 
single currency (…) At various times during the eurozone crisis, membership, governing 
structure, and operating rules of the single currency system have been fundamentally questioned 
and challenged.  
Apart from the eurozone crisis, the most recognizable feature of the EU in crisis has been the 
migration crisis, which greatly escalated in 2015 … The migration crisis has put severe strains 
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on free movement within the EU, and, indeed,  has led to a partial breakdown of Schengen. 
Another dimension of the crisis pertains to EU governance. The handling of the Eurozone and 
the migration crisis has demonstrated poor EU leadership, often slow and insufficient 
leadership, hardening national positions, uneven burden-sharing, and fraying solidarity among 
member states. (…) These features of EU governance have, in turn, fuelled Euroscepticism and 
put the credibility and democratic legitimacy of the EU system increasingly in question.’ (Dinan 
– Nugent – Paterson, 2017. pp. 1-2) 
The EU crisis has strengthened negative perceptions of the EU focusing on its often slow, 
bureaucratic nature and lack of unity among member states. These developments – together 
with the unprecedented Brexit process – have questioned the future of the European integration 
and have made the previous undeniable successes relative. 
Regarding the future of regional cooperation, inner coherence is an essential question. An 
innovation of new regionalism in the 1990s was that countries with different levels of 
development could join the same regional organisation, but since then negative side effects have 
become obvious. Regional integrations often produce smaller ‘subgroups’, a group of member 
states having similar real or perceived interests and are able to act united to have a word and 
more influence. These phenomena are often connected to ‘multi-speed’ integration models. 
Typically, smaller and/or poorer countries within the regional bloc form such subgroups in 
order to prevent/protect against the dominance of regional leaders. Today, Visegrad-4 countries 
in the EU is a visible and loud example, but there is also a dividedness in Mercosur between 
Brazil and the smaller economies. In ASEAN, enlargement in the 1990s included less 
developed countries compared to the original members resulting in serious conflicts, not only 
in economic but also in political terms. NAFTA had to be renegotiated during the Trump 
administration because of a deep conflict between developed (US) and developing (Mexico) 
member of the agreement.  
Smaller subgroups within regional organisations might have effective results as they can bring 
issues unrepresented to the table, might turn attention to inner conflicts and ruptures and 
altogether might achieve more democratic operation of the given regional cooperation. On the 
other hand, in practice, these subgroups often represent the disillusionment of poorer or smaller 
member states as their original objective (to develop and be an equal member of the club) could 
not be achieved and they perceive their position as subordinate to the ‘real’ decision makers. 
Joining a regional cooperation – especially in the case of the European Union – is often 
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perceived as a chance for smaller countries to close up. If they do not manage to reach the level 
of development they wanted, frustration might be the result, blaming the given regional 
cooperation for their relative underdevelopment – and not considering the positive 
consequences of their membership. These developments might weaken the integration if the 
subgroups are not able or willing to follow the basic principles of the integration. They might 
undermine the cooperation by perceiving the given institution as an ‘enemy’, thus making 
common thoughts and grounds impossible. 
The EU has rather a sophisticated mechanism (the cohesion fund) to limit inherited and/or 
newly created differences within the integration. But this is also a principle and measure 
difficult to follow – other regional integrations can hardly introduce similar tools because of 
lack of resources and the swallow-level of integration. Mercosur attempted to diminish 
asymmetries by the Fund for Structural Convergence of MERCOSUR  (FOCEM) – through an 
annual contribution of over $100 million dollars, FOCEM funds projects aimed at promoting 
competitiveness, social cohesion and the reduction of asymmetries among members involved 
in the process. (Mercosur official site) 
The European Union is still a motor regionalism, but it is particularly active in building inter-
regional relations to create a net of inter-regional links covering the whole world. These inter-
regional forums support stronger and more dynamic cooperation between regional groupings 
and serve as an essential level of global governance. The EU is an initiator of this process and 
till today keeps its central position in inter-regionalism. 
But it is important to emphasize that the study of regionalism has shifted towards the Pacific 
region. As the economic importance of China and East Asia is increasing, East Asian 
regionalism has become an important target of attention. ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, ASEM (Asia-
Europe Meeting) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation are important new forums 
collecting main actors of world politics and world economy. Probably, in the next decades, 
these regional and inter-regional forms of cooperation will be strengthened and the East Asian 
region will be more embedded in the global process of regionalization. It is a question of the 
future, whether regionalism in Asia will follow the path of Europe in regionalism (probably 
not) or which could be those norms, values, principles or institutions that could be taken from 
the experience of the European integration. 
South-South cooperation (SSC) will probably be stronger in inter-regional relations of the 21st 
century, institutionalisation of SSC might develop in the next decades. Forums for regular 
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cooperation might be established – with the exclusion of developed countries. The role of China 
and India is essential regarding these future developments, their ideas and attitude towards 
regionalism and inter-regionalism will determine these new forms of cooperation. 
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Annex 
 
Table 1 Regional integrations in comparison 
 
Region Population GDP GDP/capita 
NAFTA 488,899,434 23.4 trillion USD 47,923 USD 
Mercosur 295,007,000 3.396 trillion 
USD 
19,569 USD 
European Union 512,600,000 19.1 trillion USD 38,370 USD 
ASEAN 622,000,000 2.92 trillion USD 4,519 USD 
Gulf Cooperation 
Council 
54,000,000 3.464 trillion 
USD 
34,265USD 
ECOWAS 349,154,000 0,675 trillion 
USD 
1,985USD 
Data collected by the author. 
 
 
 
Table 2 Number of existing ROs by region, 1945-2015 
 
 
Source: https://www.researchgate.net/project/Comparative-Regional-Organizations-Project-CROP/figures 
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  Table 3 Policy Areas of Regional Trade Agreements 
 
 
 
Table 4 Areas of competence of ROs (multiple answers possible) 
 
 
Source: https://www.researchgate.net/project/Comparative-Regional-Organizations-Project-CROP/figures 
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Map 1 Organizations grouping almost all the countries in their respective continents 
 
 
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regional_organization#/media/File:Continental_Orgs_Map.png 
 
 
Map 2 Several smaller regional organizations with non-overlapping memberships 
 
 
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regional_organization#/media/File:Regional_Organizations_Map.png 
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Table 5 Exports of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) 
 
Table 6 RTA’S share in global exports of manufactured goods and in intra-RTA trade 
 
